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Abstract
This Article compares the protections and rights provided an accused before the Tribunal
with those protections and rights provided an accused before U.S. courts-martial. Part I provides
an overview of the statute creating the Tribunal and identifies the general principles the statute
appears to advance. Part II analyzes the Tribunal’s procedural and evidentiary rules, compares
these rules to the analogous military rules, and discusses how well the Tribunal rules comport
with the general principles advanced by the statute. This Article concludes that the Tribunal rules,
although fundamentally sound, are not as protective of the individual rights of the accused as the
military justice system and recommends modifications of the Tribunal rules to remedy the noted
deficiencies.
ARTICLES
LOST SOVEREIGNTY? THE IMPLICATIONS




On December 15, 1993, the Uruguay Round multilateral
trade negotiations were concluded after seven years of extensive
and often contentious negotiations. The Uruguay Round Agree-
ments were subsequently signed on April 15, 1994 in Marrakesh,
Morocco by 108 countries.' The Uruguay Round Agreements
were designed to fundamentally restructure and improve the
multilateral trading system that had developed under the 1947
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT").2
The Uruguay Round Agreements will have a significant im-
pact on international trade.3 They extend the basic GATT
framework on goods to include services, intellectual property
rights, and investment matters. The Uruguay Round Agree-
ments also increase existing GATT coverage in agriculture, tex-
tiles and clothing, and government procurement. Tariffs are re-
duced by approximately thirty-eight percent in diverse sectors,
such as: pharmaceuticals, textiles, automobiles, steel, and food
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1. Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade
Negotiations, 33 I.L.M. 1 art. 2 (1994) [hereinafter Final Act]. By signing the Final Act,
the state representatives agreed to submit the Uruguay Round Agreements for consid-
eration by their respective competent authorities with a view to seeking approval of the
Uruguay Round Agreements in accordance with their national procedures. Id.
2. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature Oct. 30, 1947, 61
STAT. A3, 55 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter GATr].
3. See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, URUGUAY ROUND FINAL ACT SHOULD PRODUCE
OVERALL U.S. ECONOMIC GAINS (1994); EUROPEAN COMMISSION, URUGUAY ROUND:
GLOBAL AGREEMENT, GLOBAL BENEFITS (1994).
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products. In addition, the Uruguay Round Agreements establish
a new institution, the World Trade Organization ("WTO") to fa-
cilitate their implementation and administration. The WTO
provides the common institutional framework for the conduct of
international trade as set forth in the Uruguay Round Agree-
ments; establishes a forum for negotiations concerning interna-
tional trade matters; and establishes a structured, expeditious,
and binding dispute settlement process.
The Uruguay Round Agreements have been the subject of
extensive debate in the United States.4 Critics argue that the
WTO has been given too much power to regulate international
trade and that it lacks adequate safeguards to protect American
interests. 5 Indeed, they argue that the United States does not
wield sufficient power in the WTO commensurate with its inter-
national status, unlike its role in other international organiza-
tions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary
Fund.6 Moreover, critics charge that the WTO will be run by
international bureaucrats who will operate in secrecy with no ac-
countability and no conflict of interest rules.7 The essence of
these arguments rests on the notion of lost sovereignty - in
signing the Uruguay Round Agreements, the United States has
lost much of its negotiating authority on international trade mat-
ters and has subjected domestic matters to international regula-
tion.
The response of the Clinton Administration to the issue of
lost sovereignty was two-fold. In developing the implementing
4. See genera//y Harvey Berkman, As GATT Gains, Will States Wane?, NAT'L LJ., Nov.
14, 1994, at Al; GATT Implementing Legislation, 1994: Hearings on S. 2467 Before the Com-
mittee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 103rd Cong., 2nd Sess. 350 (1994) (state-
ment of Ralph Nader, Consumer Advocate, Public Citizen); Bruce Fein, Putting U.S.
Sovereignty At Risk?, WASH. TIMS, June 16, 1994, at A17; World Trade Organization, Hear-
ings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, 103rd Cong., 2nd Sess. (1994) (statement of
Bruce Fein).
5. Opponents to the Uruguay Round Agreements included such ideologically di-
verse politicians as Pat Buchanan, Ralph Nader, Ross Perot, and Jesse Jackson. See
Ralph Nader, WTO Means Rule by Unaccountable Tribunals, WALL ST. J., Aug. 17, 1994, at
A12; David Sanger, Sennate Approves Pact to Ease Trade Curbs, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2, 1994, at
Al.
6. James Gerstenzang, Senate Approves Sweeping Pact to Revise Global Trade Rules, L.A.
TIMEs, Dec. 2, 1994, at Al.
7. GATT Implementing Legislation, 1994: Hearings on S. 2467 Before the Committee on
Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 103rd Cong., 2nd Sess. 285 (1994) (statement of
Lawrence Tribe, Professor, Harvard University Law School).
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legislation, the Administration sought to clarify the relationship
between the Uruguay Round Agreements and U.S. domestic law.
The legislation provides that the Uruguay Round Agreements do
not modify or repeal any federal or state law. In addition, the
Administration agreed to support legislation that would establish
a WTO Dispute Settlement Review Commission. The Commis-
sion would independently review U.S. participation in the dis-
pute settlement process. If the Commission were to determine
that the dispute settlement process was not functioning appro-
priately, the proposed legislation would establish procedures to
facilitate the United States' withdrawal from the WTO upon
Congressional approval.
This Article reviews the Uruguay Round Agreements and
examines the implications of this new multilateral trading system
on U.S. sovereignty.8 Specifically, this Article reviews the new
dispute settlement process and the relevant U.S. legislation.
While the substantive provisions on trade are the central pur-
pose of the Uruguay Round Agreements, they ultimately rely
upon the dispute settlement process to regulate compliance.
Through the dispute settlement process, states seek to ensure
compliance with the obligations established under the Uruguay
Round Agreements. Indeed, the new Dispute Settlement Body
("DSB") can issue binding rulings and authorize the suspension
of concessions or other obligations to ensure the implementa-
tion of its rulings.9 Moreover, these rulings can no longer be
blocked by a single member. As such, it is principally the dis-
pute settlement process that raises the issue of lost sovereignty.
Part I provides an overview of the Uruguay Round Agree-
ments. It reviews the Agreement Establishing the WTO and the
Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settle-
8. See Michael Young, Dispute Resolution in the Uruguay Round: Lawyers Triumph Over
Diplomats, 29 INT'L LAw 389 (1995) (discussing Uruguay Round Agreements). The Uru-
guay Round Agreements have been the subject of extensive commentary by the legal
community. Id.; see also Thomas Dillon, Jr., The World Trade Organization: A New Legal
Order for World Trade?, 16 MicH.J. INT'L L. 349 (1995); G. Richard Shell, Trade Legalism
and International Relations Theory: An Analysis of the World Trade Organization, 44 DuKE L.
J. 829 (1995); David Gantz, A Post-Uruguay Round Introduction to International Trade Law
in the United States, 12 Amiz. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 7 (1995).
9. The Dispute Settlement Body ("DSB") is established pursuant to Article 2 of the
Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes. Un-
derstanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Dec. 15,
1993, art. 2, 33 I.L.M. 112, 114 (1994). The purpose of the DSB is to administer the
rules and procedures of the dispute settlement process. Id.
1995]
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ment of Disputes. Part II provides an overview of the U.S. imple-
menting legislation. Part III reviews the proposed Dispute Set-
tlement Review Commission. Part IV examines the implications
of the Uruguay Round Agreements on U.S. sovereignty. Specifi-
cally, it analyzes the impact of the dispute settlement process on
both federal and state law.
The issues raised by this analysis extend far beyond the
realm of international trade and the. Uruguay Round Agree-
ments. Indeed, they encompass the basic problem of achieving
international cooperation in an anarchic world. Whether ex-
pressed through the 2 x 2 matrix of the Prisoners' Dilemma or
the logic of collective action, the central issue is the same -
rational, egoistic actors will seek to maximize individual utility,
even at the cost of the common good.10
The Uruguay Round Agreements establish an institutional
framework designed to facilitate cooperative behavior in the
realm of international trade. 1 The crux of this framework is the
binding nature of the new dispute settlement process. In this
manner, the Uruguay Round Agreements address the limitations
of the original GATT structure. Indeed, the institutional frame-
work of the Uruguay Round Agreements addresses the limita-
tions of an international system where individual actors seek to
maximize self-interest at the expense of the collective good. By
examining the Uruguay Round Agreements, this Article can
serve a prescriptive role by suggesting how other international
institutions can regulate the competing struggle between domes-
10. See, e.g., Duncan Snidal, The Game Theory of International Politics, 38 WORLD POL.
25 (1985); R. Harrison Wagner, The Theory of Games and the Problem of International Coop-
eration, 77 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 330 (1983). The Prisoners' Dilemma is a game theory
model that describes how competing interests between two egoistic actors may lead to
sub-optimal behavior that inhibits cooperation. THE NEW PALGRAVE: GAME THEORY
(John Eatwell et al. eds., 1989); MORTON R. DAVIS, GAME THEORY- A NONTECHNICAL
INTRODUCTION 109-08 (rev. ed. 1983); R. DUNCAN LUCE & HOWARD RAIFFA, GAMES AND
DECISIONS: INTRODUCTION AND CITICA. SURVEY 94-95 (1957). The collective action
problem suggests that rational, self-interested individuals will not act to achieve a com-
mon group goal unless some form of coercion is present. See, e.g., ELINOR OSTROM,
GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION
(1990); MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION (1965).
11. See, e.g., Kenneth W. Abbott, The Trading Nation's Dilemma: The Functions of the
Law of International Trade, 26 HARv. INT'L LJ. 501 (1985); Robert O. Keohane, Reciprocity
in International Relations, 40 INT'L ORG. 1 (1986);Jock A. Finlayson & Mark W. Zacher,
The GATT and the Regulation of Trade Barriers: Regime Dynamics and Functions, 35 INT'L
ORG. 561 (1981).
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tic and international interests. 12
I. THE URUGUAY ROUND AGREEMENTS
The Uruguay Round Agreements consist primarily of five
separate agreements: the Agreement Establishing the WTO' 3
("WTO Agreement"), the Multilateral Trade Agreements, 4 the
Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settle-
ment of Disputes' 5 ("Dispute Settlement Understanding"), the
Trade Policy Review Mechanism,' 6 and the Plurilateral Trade
Agreements.' 7 In addition, several ministerial decisions and dec-
larations are appended to the Uruguay Round Agreements.'
8
This section will examine the WTO Agreement and the Dispute
Settlement Understanding since they establish the basic frame-
12. See GuvoRA BINDER, TREATY CONFLICr AND POLITICAL CONTRADICrION: THE DIA-
LEcrIC OF DUPLICITY 1-6, 103-34 (1988).
13. Agreement Establishing the Multilateral Trade Organization [World Trade
Organization], Dec. 15, 1993, 33 I.L.M. 13 (1994) [hereinafter WTO Agreement].
14. Agreements on Trade in Goods, Dec. 15, 1993, 33 1.L.M. 28 (1994) [hereinaf-
ter Multilateral Trade Agreements]. The Multilateral Trade Agreements are located in
Annex 1A of the WTO Agreement. WTO Agreement, supra note 13, annex IA, 33
I.L.M. at 28. The Multilateral Trade Agreements consist of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade 1994, Dec. 15, 1993, 33 I.L.M. 29 (1994), the General Agreement on
Trade in Services, Dec. 15, 1993, 33 I.L.M. 44 (1994), and the Agreement on Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Including Trade in Counterfeit Goods,
Dec. 15, 1993, 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994). The WTO Agreement also includes the Under-
standing on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes. WTO Agree-
ment, supra note 13, annex 2, Dec. 15, 1993, 33 I.L.M. at 112 [hereinafter Dispute
Settlement Understanding]. Furthermore, the WTO Agreement encompasses the
Trade Policy Review Mechanism. WTO Agreement, supra note 13, annex 3, reprinted in
GATr SECRETARIAT - TRADE NEGOTIATIONS COMMITTEE, FINAL Acr EMBODYING THE RE-
SULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS MTN/FA II-A3
(1993). Lastly, the WTO Agreement includes the Plurilateral Trade Agreements. WTO
Agreement, supra note 13, annex 4, reprinted in Id. at MTN/FA II-A4.
15. Dispute Settlement Understanding, supra note 14, 33 I.L.M. at 112.
16. Reprinted in GATr SECRETARIAT - TRADE NEGOTIATIONS COMMITrEE, FINAL ACT
EMBODYING THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIA-
TIONS MTN/FA II-AS (1993).
17. WTO Agreement, supra note 13, annex 4, reprinted in GA-r SECRETARIAT -
TRADE NEGOTIATIONS COMMITTEE, FINAL Acr EMBODYING THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY
ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS MTN/FA II-A4 (1993). The Pluri-
lateral Trade Agreements consist of the Agreement on Trade in Civil Aircraft, the
Agreement on Government Procurement, the International Dairy Agreement, and the
International Bovine Meat Agreement. Id.
18. See, e.g., Decision on Measures in Favor of Least-Developed Countries, Declaration on
the Contribution of the World Trade Organization to Achieving Greater Coherence in Global Eco-
nomic Policymaking, in, JOHN JACKSON ET AL., 1995 DOCUMENTS SUPPLEMENT TO LEGAL
PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 422, 424 (1995).
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work for ensuring compliance with the Uruguay Round Agree-
ments.
A. The Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization
The preamble of the WTO Agreement sets forth its pur-
pose: "[T]o develop an integrated, more viable and durable
multilateral trading system encompassing the General Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade, the results of past trade liberalization
efforts, and all of the results of the Uruguay Round of Multilat-
eral Trade Negotiations."' 9
The WTO Agreement establishes the WTO. 2° The WTO
provides the common institutional framework for the conduct of
trade relations among its Members in matters relating to the
Uruguay Round Agreements and its associated legal instru-
ments. 21 The primary function of the WTO is to facilitate the
implementation, administration, and operation of the WTO
Agreement, the Multilateral Trade Agreements, and the Pluri-
lateral Trade Agreements. 22 The WTO is also responsible for ad-
ministering the Dispute Settlement Understanding and the
Trade Policy Review Mechanism.23 Indeed, the Multilateral
Trade Agreements, the Dispute Settlement Understanding, and
the Trade Policy Review Mechanism are integral parts of the
WTO Agreement, binding upon all Members.24
The WTO consists of a Ministerial Conference, a General
19. WTO Agreement, supra note 13, pmbl., 33 I.L.M. at 15.
20. Id. art. I, 33 I.L.M. at 15. The World Trade Organization ("WTO") is the third
incarnation of an international organization that would regulate a multilateral trading
system. The original concept, the International Trade Organization was developed in
the original GATT agreement. Throughout the Uruguay Round, the proposed interna-
tional organization was referred to as the Multilateral Trade Organization. "Multilat-
eral" was replaced by "World" at the conclusion of the Uruguay Round. See Andreas F.
Lowenfeld, Remedies Along With Rights: Institutional Reform in the New GATT, 88 A.J.I.L.
477, 478 (1994); CLARE WILCOX, A CHARTER FOR WORLD TRADE (1949).
21. WTO Agreement, supra note 13, art. 11(1), 33 I.L.M. at 15-16. Article VIII pro-
vides that the WTO is granted legal personality. Id. art. VIII, 33 I.L.M. at 18. Members
are required to accord the WTO such legal capacity as may be necessary for the exercise
of its functions. Id.
22. Id. art. III(1), 33 I.L.M. at 16. "The MTO shall facilitate the implementation,
administration, operation, and further the objectives of this Agreement and of the Mul-
tilateral Trade Agreements, and shall also provide the framework for the implementa-
tion, administration and operation of the Plurilateral Trade Agreements." Id.
23. Id. art. 111(2), 33 I.L.M. at 16.
24. Id. art. 11(2), 33 I.L.M. at 15-16. In contrast, the Plurilateral Trade Agreements
are only binding upon states that have accepted them. Id. art. 11(3), 33 I.L.M. at 16.
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Council, a Secretariat, and a number of small, subsidiary enti-
ties. 5 The Ministerial Conference is composed of representa-
tives from each Member State. 6 The Ministerial Conference is
required to meet at least once every two years and is responsible
for carrying out the functions of the WTO. It has the authority
to take decisions on all matters under any of the Multilateral
Trade Agreements. The General Council is also composed of
representatives from all the Members. 7 In the intervals between
meetings of the Ministerial Conference, its functions are con-
ducted by the General Council. The General Council convenes
as appropriate to discharge the responsibilities of the DSB2 8 and
the Trade Policy Review Body.29 The Ministerial Conference
and the General Council have the exclusive authority to adopt
interpretations of the WTO Agreement and of the Multilateral
Trade Agreements.30 The Secretariat, headed by a Director-
General, is responsible for providing administrative oversight to
the WTO. The subsidiary entities oversee the functioning of the
their respective agreements. 3
1
The WTO continues the practice of decision-making by con-
sensus that developed under the GATT. 2 A matter is deemed to
25. Id. arts. IV, VI, 33 I.L.M. at 16-18.
26. Id. art. IV(I), 33 I.L.M. at 16.
27. Id. art. IV(2), 33 I.L.M. at 16.
28. See supra note 9 and accompanying text (discussing the DSB).
29. The Trade Policy Review Body is established pursuant to Article C(i) of the
Trade Policy Review Mechanism. GATT SECRETARIAT - TRADE NEGOTIATIONS COMMIT-
TEE, FINAL Acr EMBODYING THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTINATIONAL
TRADE NEGOTIATIONS (1993) MTN/FA II-A3 p. 1.
30. WTO Agreement, supra note 13, art. IX(2), 33 I.L.M. at 19. The decision to
adopt an interpretation shall be taken by a three-fourths majority of the Members. Id.
31. Id. art. IV(5), 33 I.L.M. at 17. Article IV(5) provides for the establishment of a
Council for Trade in Goods, a Council for Trade in Services, and a Council for Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights ("Council for TRIPS"). Id. The Council
for Trade in Goods oversees the functioning of the Multilateral Trade Agreements. Id.
The Council for Trade in Services oversees the functioning of the General Agreement
on Trade in Services. Id. The Council for TRIPS oversees the functioning of the Agree-
ment on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights. Id. In addition, Article
IV(7) provides that the Ministerial Conference shall establish a Committee on Trade
and Development, a Committee on Balance-of-Payments Restrictions, and a Committee
on Budget, Finance, and Administration. Id. art. IV(7), 33 I.L.M. at 17.
32. Id. art. IX(l), 33 I.L.M. at 19. The term "GATT 1947" refers to the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade dated October 30, 1947, annexed to the Final Act
Adopted at the Conclusion of the Second Session of the Preparatory Committee of the
United Nations Conference on Trade and Employment, as subsequently amended or
modified. Id. art. 11(4), 33 I.L.M. at 15-16. The term "GATT 1994" refers to the Gen-
eral Agreement on Tariffs and Trade annexed to the WTO Agreement. Id.
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be decided by consensus if no Member present at the meeting
when the decision is taken formally objects to the proposed deci-
sion. 3 Where a decision cannot be arrived at by consensus, the
matter shall be decided by voting. At meetings of the Ministerial
Council and the General Council, each Member of the WTO has
one vote.34 Decisions are taken by a majority of the votes cast,
unless otherwise provided. For example, decisions by the Gen-
eral Council when convened as the DSB shall be taken only in
accordance with the provisions of Article 2(2) of the Dispute Set-
tlement Understanding. 35
Membership in the WTO is open to states that are parties to
the GATT 1947 and that accept the WTO Agreement and the
Multilateral Trade Agreements. 36 There is no requirement, how-
ever, that WTO Members sign the Plurilateral Trade Agree-
ments, and the agreements are not binding on states who have
not accepted them. In addition, any state or separate customs
territory possessing full autonomy in the conduct of its external
commercial relations, as well as additional areas provided. in the
Uruguay Round Agreements, may accede to the WTO Agree-
ment.3 8 Such accession applies to the WTO Agreement and the
Multilateral Trade Agreements. 9 Decisions on accession are
taken by the Ministerial Conference and require a two-thirds ma-
jority vote of the WTO Members.
Each Member State is required to ensure the conformity of
its laws, regulations, and administrative procedures with its obli-
gations under the Uruguay Round Agreements.4 ° In excep-
33. Id. art. IX, 33 I.L.M. at 19.
34. Id. at art. IX(l), 33 I.L.M. at 19.
35. Id. art. IX, 33 I.L.M. at 19.
36. Id. art. XI, 33 I.L.M. at 21. These states are considered original Members of
the WTO. Id.
37. Id. art. 11(3), 33 I.L.M. at 16..In contrast, the Tokyo Round Agreements did
not require GATT Members to join all the separate agreements.
38. Id. art. XII, 33 I.L.M. at 21.
39. Id. art. XII(1), 33 I.L.M. at 21.
40. Id. art. XVI(4), 33 I.L.M. at 23. Article XIII provides an exception to the prin-
ciple of universal application of the Uruguay Round Agreements to Member states. Id.
art. XIII, 33 I.L.M. at 22. It provides that the WTO Agreement and the Multilateral
Trade Agreements shall not apply as between any Member and any other Member if
either Member, at the time either becomes a Member, does not consent to such appli-
cation. Id. art. XIII(1), 33 I.L.M. at 22. This exception may only be invoked between
original Members of the WTO Agreement who were contracting parties to GATT 1947
and who had invoked Article XXXV, which was effective as between those contracting
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tional circumstances, the Ministerial Conference may decide to
waive an obligation imposed on a Member, provided that three-
fourths of the WTO Members approve such a waiver.41 Any
waiver granted for a period of more than one year shall be re-
viewed by the Ministerial Conference not later than one year af-
ter it is granted, and thereafter annually until the waiver termi-
nates.42 The WTO Agreement provides that least-developed
countries, as recognized by the United Nations, are only re-
quired to undertake commitments and concessions to the ex-
tent consistent with their individual development, financial and
trade needs, or their administrative and institutional capabili-
ties.43
Any WTO Member may initiate a proposal to amend the
WTO Agreement or the Multilateral Trade Agreements by sub-
mitting such a proposal to the Ministerial Conference." Any de-
cision by the Ministerial Conference to submit the proposed
amendment to the Members for acceptance must be taken by
consensus. If a consensus is reached, the Ministerial Conference
shall submit the proposed amendment to the Members for ac-
ceptance. If a consensus is not reached, the Ministerial Confer-
ence must decide by a two-thirds majority whether to submit the
proposed amendment to the Members for acceptance. Different
procedures have been established for approving amendments,
depending on the nature of the original provision and the scope
of the amendment. For example, amendments to the provisions
of Articles IX (Decision-making) and X (Amendments) of the
WTO Agreement, Articles I and II of GATT 1994, Article II(1)
of the General Agreement on Trade in Services ("GATS"), and
Article 4 of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellec-
tual Property Rights ("TRIPS") require unanimous approval by
all the Member States.45 Amendments to the WTO Agreement
or portions of the Multilateral Trade Agreements, other than
those listed in Article X(2), which are of a nature that would
parties at the time of entry into force of the WTO Agreement. Id. art. XIII, 33 I.L.M. at
22.
41. Id. art. IX(3), 33 I.LM. at 19.
42. Id. art. IX(4), 33 I.L.M. at 19.
43. Id. art. XI(2), 33 I.L.M. at 21.
44. Id. art. X(1), 33 I.L.M. at 20-21.
45. Id. art. X(2), 33 I.L.M. at 20. The General Agreement on Trade in Services
("GATS") and the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
("TRIPS") are parts of the Multilateral Trade Agreements.
1995]
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alter the rights and obligations of the Members, require a two-
thirds approval by the Member States and take effect only for
those Members who have accepted them.46 In contrast, amend-
ments to the WTO or portions of the Multilateral Trade Agree-
ments, other than those listed in Article X(2), that would not
alter the rights and obligations of the Members, shall take effect
for all Members upon acceptance by two-thirds of the Member
States.47
No reservation may be made to any provision of the WTO
Agreement.48 Reservations in respect to a provision of the Multi-
lateral Trade Agreements may only be made to the extent pro-
vided for in those Agreements. Similarly, reservations in respect
to a provision of a Plurilateral Trade Agreement are governed by
the provisions of the relevant agreement.
Finally, any Member may withdraw from the WTO Agree-
ment on six months notice at any time and for any reason.49
Such withdrawal applies to both the WTO Agreement and the
Multilateral Trade Agreements. 50
B. The Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the
Settlement of Disputes
The Dispute Settlement Understanding is contained in An-
nex 2 of the WTO Agreement.51 It applies to disputes brought
pursuant to the consultation and dispute settlement provisions
of the WTO Agreement, the Multilateral Trade Agreements, and
the Plurilateral Trade Agreements ("Covered Agreements").52
46. Id. art. X(3), 33 I.L.M. at 20. The Ministerial Conference may, however, de-
cide by a three-fourths majority of the Members that a state which has not accepted
such an amendment is free to withdraw from the WTO, or may remain a Member with
the consent of the Ministerial Conference. Id.
47. Id. art. X(4), 33 I.L.M. at 20.
48. Id. art. XVI(5), 33 I.L.M. at 23.
49. Id. art. XV, 33 I.L.M. at 23.
50. Id.
51. Dispute Settlement Understanding, supra note 14, 33 I.L.M. at 112. See gener-
ally ROBERT E. HUDEC, ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAw: THE EVOLUTION OF THE
MODERN GATT LEGAL SYSTEM (1993) (analyzing GATT legal system prior to WTO);
GATT AND CONFLICT MANAGEMENT: A TRANSATLANTIC STRATEGY FOR A STRONGER RE-
GIME (Reinhard Rode ed., 1990); ROBERT E. HUDEC, THE GATT LEGAL SYSTEM AND
WORLD TRADE DIPLOMACY (1990);JOHN H.JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: LAw
AND POLICY OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS (1989).
52. Dispute Settlement Understanding, supra note 14, art. 1(1), 33 I.L.M. at 114.
Appendix 2 of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement
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The dispute settlement provisions of the Covered Agreements
may be invoked with respect to measures affecting their obser-
vance taken by regional or local governments or authorities
within the territory of a Member State.5" When the DSB deter-
mines that a provision of a Covered Agreement has not been
observed, the Member State is required to take reasonable meas-
ures to ensure its observance.
The Dispute Settlement Understanding establishes the DSB
to administer the rules, procedures, and the consultation and
dispute settlement provisions of the Covered Agreements.54 The
DSB is empowered to establish panels, adopt panel and Appel-
late Body reports, maintain surveillance of implementation of
rulings and recommendations, and authorize suspension of con-
cessions and other obligations under the Covered Agreements.55
The DSB is required to inform the relevant WTO councils and
committees of any developments in disputes related to provi-
sions of the respective Covered Agreements.56 The DSB meets as
often as necessary to carry out its functions provided in the Dis-
pute Settlement Understanding.5 7 Further, decisions by the DSB
are made by consensus.5"
The Dispute Settlement Understanding indicates that the
dispute settlement system of the WTO is a central element in
providing security and predictability to the multilateral trading
system. 59 The WTO Members recognize that the Understanding
of Disputes ("Dispute Settlement Understanding") contains a list of special rules and
procedures on dispute settlement contained in the WTO Agreement, the Multilateral
Trade Agreements, and the Plurilateral Trade Agreements. Id. art. 1(2), 33 I.L.M. at
114. To the extent that there is a difference between the rules and procedures of the
Dispute Settlement Understanding and the special rules and procedures set forth in
Appendix 2, the special rules in Appendix 2 shall prevail. Id.
53. Id. art. 22(9), 33 I.L.M. at 128.
54. Id. art. 2(1), 33 I.L.M. at 114.
55. Id. art 2(1), 33 I.L.M. at 114. The DSB is required to establish a standing
Appellate Body with jurisdiction to hear appeals from panel cases. Id. art. 17(i), 33
I.L.M. at 123-24.
56. Id. art. 2(2), 33 I.L.M. at 114.
57. Id. art. 2(3), 33 I.L.M. at 114.
58. Id. art. 2(4), 33 I.L.M. at 114. The DSB shall be deemed to have decided a
matter by consensus if no Member, present at the meeting of the DSB when the deci-
sion is taken, formally objects to the proposed decision. Id. art. 2(4) n.1, 33 I.L.M. at
114.
59. Id. art. 3(2), 33 I.L.M. at 115. "The dispute settlement system of the WTO is a
central element in providing security and predictability to the multilateral trading sys-
tem." Id.
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serves to preserve the rights and obligations of Members under
the Covered Agreements and to clarify the existing provisions of
those agreements in accordance with customary rules of inter-
pretation of public international law.6" Indeed, the prompt set-
tlement of disputes between Member States, asserting that bene-
fits accruing to them directly or indirectly under the covered
Agreements are being impaired, is considered essential to the
effective functioning of the WTO and the maintenance of a
proper balance between the rights and obligations of Member
States. 61 Consequently, the Members affirm their adherence to
the principles for the management of disputes previously ap-
plied under Articles XXII and XXIII of GATT 1947 as well as the
rules and procedures described in the Dispute Settlement Un-
derstanding. 62 All solutions to matters formally raised under the
consultation and dispute settlement provisions of the Covered
Agreements must be consistent and must not nullify or impair
any benefits accruing to any Member under those agreements. 63
Essentially, the aim of the dispute settlement mechanism is
to secure positive solutions to disputes. 64 Indeed, it is under-
stood that the use of the dispute settlement process should not
be considered a contentious act and that, if a dispute arises, all
Members will, in good faith, engage in the procedures in an ef-
fort to resolve the dispute.65 A solution that is mutually accepta-
ble to both parties and is consistent with the Covered Agree-
ments will be preferred. In the absence of a mutually agreed
upon solution, generally, the first objective of the dispute settle-
ment mechanism will be to secure the withdrawal of measures
that are inconsistent with the Covered Agreements. 66 The mech-
anism should only resort to compensation, however, when the
immediate withdrawal of the inconsistent measures are impracti-
cal. As a last resort, the dispute settlement mechanism will sus-
60. Id.
61. Id. art. 3(3), 33 I.L.M. at 115.
62. Id. art. 3(1), 33 I.L.M. at 115. Article XXII of GATI 1947 contains procedures
for consultation with respect to any matter affecting the operation of the GATT. GATT,
supra note 2, 61 Stat. A3, 55 U.N.T.S. 187. Article XXIII of GATT 1947 contains proce-
dures to be used in the event that any benefit accruing under the GAIT is nullified or
impaired. Id. 61 Stat. at A64-65, 55 U.N.T.S. at 267-68.
63. Dispute Settlement Understanding, supra note 14, art. 3(5), 33 I.L.M. at 115.
64. Id. art. 3(7), 33 I.L.M. at 115.
65. Id. art. 3(10), 33 I.L.M. at 116.
66. Id. art: 3(7), 33 I.L.M. at 115.
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pend concessions or other obligations provided under the Cov-
ered Agreements on a discriminatory basis, subject to authoriza-
tion by the DSB.
The Dispute Settlement Understanding provides an exten-
sive range of mechanisms for the resolution of disputes. These
procedures include consultations, good offices, conciliation, me-
diation, and arbitration. 67 The most important dispute settle-
ment procedure, however, involves the establishment of panels.
The Dispute Settlement Understanding provides an extensive, if
not exhaustive, set of procedures for the establishment and op-
eration of dispute settlement panels.6" Unlike the prior dispute
settlement process, the Dispute Settlement Understanding estab-
lishes strict time frames for the panel process, ensuring greater
transparency and likelihood of success.69
If a complaint cannot be resolved through consultations or
similar procedures, a complaining party may petition the DSB
for the establishment of a panel.7" Panels are composed of three
individuals who are nominated by the Secretariat.7 ' If either
party to the dispute opposes the nominations, the Director-Gen-
eral of the WTO shall determine the composition of the panel,
in conjunction with the Chairman of the DSB and the relevant
committee or council.7"
The purpose of the panel is make an objective assessment of
the matter before it, including an assessment of the facts of the
case and the applicability of and conformity with the relevant
Covered Agreements." The panels are empowered to seek in-
67. Id. arts. 4-5, 25, 33 I.L.M. at 116-118, 129.
68. Id. arts. 6-22, 33 I.L.M. at 118-28.
69. Id. art. 20, 33 I.L.M. at 125. Unless otherwise agreed, the period from the date
of the establishment of the panel by the DSB until the date the DSB considers the panel
or appellate report for adoption shall generally not exceed nine months. Id. If the
panel report is appealed the time period must generally not exceed twelve months. Id.
70. Id. art. 6(1), 33 I.L.M. at 118. The panel shall be established no later than the
DSB meeting following that at which the request first appears as an item on the DSB's
agenda, unless the DSB decides by consensus not to establish a panel. Id.
71. Id. art. 8(6), 33 I.L.M. at 119. The Secretariat is responsible for maintaining a
list of available panel members. Id. art. 8(4), 33 I.L.M. at 119.
72. Id. art. 8(7), 33 I.L.M. at 119.
73. Id. art 11, 33 I.L.M. at 120. Panels have the following terms of reference un-
less the parties to the dispute agree otherwise within twenty days from the establishment
of the panel:
To examine, in light of the relevant provisions in (name of the covered agree-
ment(s) cited by the parties to the dispute), the matter referred to the DSB by
(name of party) in document... and to make such findings as will assist the
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formation from any relevant source and may consult experts
when necessary. 4 Each party to the dispute may submit written
submissions to the panel for consideration.75 In addition, the
parties meet with the panel on at least two occasions to present
oral arguments and provide formal rebuttals to opposing argu-
ments. Throughout this process, panel deliberations are confi-
dential. 76 The parties to the dispute, as well as other interested
parties may be present at panel meetings only when invited by
the panel. Otherwise, the panel meets in closed session.
Following its consideration of the written and oral submis-
sions of the parties, the panel issues the descriptive sections of its
draft report to the parties.77 The parties may submit written
comments on the draft report to the panel.78 The panel then
issues an interim report to the parties, including both the de-
scriptive sections and the panel's findings and conclusions.79
Where a panel concludes that a measure is inconsistent with a
Covered Agreement, it shall recommend that the Member con-
cerned bring the measure into conformity with that Agree-
ment.80 A party may submit a request for the panel to review
specific aspects of the interim report prior to the circulation of
the final report to all WTO Members.81 If no comments are re-
ceived from any party, the interim report shall be considered the
final panel report.8 " The panel shall submit its findings in the
form of a written report to the DSB.83 The report of the panel
shall set out the findings of fact, the applicability of relevant pro-
visions, and the basic rationale behind any findings and recom-
mendations that it makes.84 If the parties to the dispute settle
DSB in making the recommendations or in giving the rulings provided for in
that/those agreement(s).
Id. art. (7)1, 33 I.L.M. at 118.
74. Id. art. 13(2), 33 I.L.M. at 122.
75. Id. art. 12(6), 33 I.L.M. at 121.
76. Id. art. 14, 33 I.L.M. at 122.
77. Id. art. 15(1), 33 I.L.M. at 122. The descriptive section includes the factual and
argument sections of the draft report. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. art. 15(2), 33 I.L.M. at 122.
80. Id. art. 19(1), 33 I.L.M. at 124.
81. Id. art. 15(2), 33 LL.M. at 122. At the request of a party, the panel shall hold
an additional meeting with the parties on the issues identified in the written comments.
Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. art. 12(7), 33 I.L.M. at 121.
84. Id.
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the matter, the report of the panel shall be confined to a brief
description of the case and to reporting that a solution has been
reached.85
The DSB is required to adopt the panel report within sixty
days of the date of circulation of the panel report to the Mem-
bers unless the DSB decides by consensus not to adopt the re-
port.86 A party to the dispute may formally notify the DSB of its
decision to appeal the panel report during the sixty-day period.87
An appeal is limited to issues of law covered in the panel report
and legal interpretations developed by the panel.88 Only parties
to the dispute, not third parties, may appeal a panel report.89 As
a general rule, the appellate proceedings must conclude within
sixty days from the date a party to the dispute formally notifies
the DSB of its decision to appeal.9" In no case shall proceedings
exceed ninety days.
The DSB is authorized to establish the Appellate Body to
hear appeals from panel reports. 1 The Appellate Body may up-
hold, modify, or reverse the legal findings and conclusions of
the panel.9" If the Appellate Body concludes that a measure is
inconsistent with a Covered Agreement, it shall recommend that
the Member concerned bring the measure into conformity with
that Agreement.93 The report shall be adopted by the DSB and
unconditionally accepted by the parties to the dispute unless the
DSB decides by consensus not to adopt the report within thirty
days following its circulation to the DSB Members.94
Within thirty days following the date of adoption of the
panel or Appellate Body report, the Member State is required to
inform the DSB of its intentions with respect to the implementa-
tion of the DSB's recommendations and rulings.95 Prompt com-
85. Id.
86. Id. art. 16(4), 33 I.L.M. at 123. In order to provide sufficient time for the
Members to consider panel reports, the reports shall not be considered for adoption by
the DSB until 20 days after the date they have been circulated to the Members. Id. art.
16(1), 33 I.L.M. at 122.
87. Id. art. 16(4), 33 I.L.M. at 123.
88. Id. art. 17(6), 33 I.L.M. at 123.
89. Id. art. 17(4), 33 I.L.M. at 123.
90. Id. art. 17(5), 33 I.L.M. at 123.
91. Id. art. 17(1), 33 I.L.M. at 123.
92. Id. art. 17(13), 33 I.L.M. at 124.
93. Id. art. 19(1), 33 I.L.M. at 124.
94. Id. art. 17(14), 33 I.L.M. at 124.
95. Id. art. 21(3), 33 I.L.M. at 125.
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pliance with recommendations and rulings of the DSB is essen-
tial to ensure DSB's effective resolution of disputes.96 If it is im-
practical to comply immediately with the DSB's
recommendations and rulings, the Member State is granted a
reasonable time in which to do so.9 7 Unless the panel or Appel-
late Body extends the time for providing their report, the period
from the date of establishment of the panel by the DSB until the
date of determination of the reasonable period of time shall not
exceed fifteen months, unless the parties to the dispute agree
otherwise. 98
The DSB is required to oversee the implementation of
adopted recommendations and rulings.99 If the recommenda-
tions and rulings are not implemented in a reasonable period of
time, compensation and suspension of concessions or other obli-
gations may be available as interim measures. °00 Compensation,
however, is voluntary and requires negotiations between the af-
fected parties.1"' If no satisfactory compensation is agreed upon,
any party that has invoked the dispute settlement mechanisms
may request authorization from the DSB to suspend the applica-
tion of concessions or other obligations under the Covered
Agreements.02 The DSB is required to grant authorization to
suspend concessions or other obligations within thirty days of
the expiration of the reasonable period of time, unless the DSB
96. Id. art. 21(1), 33 I.L.M. at 125.
97. Id. art. 21(3), 33 I.L.M. at 125. Article 21(3) provides that the reasonable pe-
riod of time shall be:
(a) the period of time proposed by the Member concerned, provided that
such period is approved by the DSB; or, in the absence of such approval,
(b) a period of time mutually agreed by the parties to the dispute within 45
days after the date of adoption of the recommendations and rulings; or, in the
absence of such agreement,
(c) a period of time determined through binding arbitration within 90 days
following adoption of the recommendations and rulings. In such arbitration,
a guideline for the arbitrator should be that the reasonable period of time to
implement panel or Appellate Body recommendations should not exceed 15
months from the date of adoption of a panel or Appellate Body report. How-
ever, that time may be shorter or longer, depending upon the particular cir-
cumstances.
Id.
98. Id. art. 21(4), 33 I.L.M. at 125-26.
99. Id. art. 21(6), 33 I.L.M. at 126.
100. Id. art. 22(1), 33 I.L.M. at 126.
101. Id.
102. Id. art. 22(2), 33 I.L.M. at 126.
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decides by consensus to reject the request.10 3 The level of sus-
pension of concessions or other obligations authorized by the
DSB must be equivalent to the level of the original nullification
or impairment. 104 Such measures shall be temporary and may
only apply until such time as the inconsistent measures are re-
moved or a mutually satisfactory solution is reached.10 5
The Dispute Settlement Understanding affirms the multilat-
eral approach to dispute settlement in the Uruguay Round
Agreements. 0 6 When Members seek redress for a violation of
obligations, for other nullification or impairment of benefits
under the Covered Agreements, or for an impediment to the
attainment of any objective of the Covered Agreements, they
shall have recourse to, and abide by, the rules and procedures of
the Dispute Settlement Understanding.0 7 Thus, the dispute set-
tlement mechanism established in the Dispute Settlement Un-
derstanding represents Members' sole recourse when violations
occur or when benefits are impaired or impeded.108
II. THE URUGUAY ROUND AGREEMENTS ACT
On December 15, 1993, the Clinton Administration notified
Congress of its intention to enter into the Uruguay Round
Agreements.' 09 In his notification letter, President Clinton
stated that the Agreements fulfilled the overall U.S. negotiating
objectives:" 0 first, the Agreements establish more open, equita-
103. Id. art. 22(6), 33 I.L.M. at 127-28.
104. Id. art. 22(4), 33 I.L.M. at 127.
105. Id. art. 22(8), 33 I.L.M. at 128.
106. Id. art. 23, 33 I.L.M. at 128-29.
107. Id. art. 23(1), 33 I.L.M. at 128.
108. Id. art. 23(2), 33 I.L.M. at 128.
109. 58 Fed. Reg. 67,264-67 (1993). The United States negotiated the Uruguay
Round Agreements pursuant to fast-track procedures, which were authorized by Con-
gress in 1988. 19 U.S.C. §§ 2191-903 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). Under these procedures,
the Administration was required to notify Congress of its intention to enter the Uru-
guay Round Agreements 120 calendar days before signing the Uruguay Round Agree-
ments. 19 U.S.C. § 2902(e) (3)(A) (1988 & Supp. V 1993). Upon the submission of the
implementing legislation to Congress, the House is required to vote on the legislation
within 60 days and the Senate within 90 days. Schedule for Week of November 28, 1994,
Congressional Press Releases, Nov. 28, 1994. Motions to consider such agreements are
privileged and amendments are not allowed. 19 U.S.C. § 2191(f) (1)-(2). See generally
Harold H. Koh, The Fast Track and United States Trade Policy, 18 BRooK. J. INT'L. L. 143
(1992); Edmund W. Sim, Derailing the Fast-Track for International Trade Agreements, 5 FLA.
J. INT'L. L. 471 (1990).
110. See Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Chapter 17, Negotia-
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ble, and reciprocal market access that the existing GATT system;
second, they reduce or eliminate barriers and other trade-dis-
torting policies and practices; third, the Agreements create a
more effective system of international trading disciplines and
procedures. Furthermore, President Clinton indicated that the
United States would enter into the Agreements on April 15,
1994, after which the Agreements would be submitted to Con-
gress for approval.111 He added, however, that the Agreements
would not bind the United States and, therefore, would have no
domestic legal force until Congress approved them and enacted
the appropriate implementing legislation.
112
The Clinton Administration prepared the implementing
legislation in consultation with public and private sector enti-
ties. ' 13 The perspectives of individual state and local govern-
ments on the Uruguay Round Agreements were submitted pri-
marily by the Intergovernmental Policy Advisory Committee. 4
In addition, the Advisory Committee for Trade Policy and Nego-
tiations submitted the perspectives of both public and private
sector entities."1 5 The Clinton Administration also received
tion and Implementation of Trade Agreements, 19 U.S.C. § 2901(a) (1988 & Supp. V
1993) (delineating overall trade negotiating objectives set forth by Congress). Besides
the overall trade negotiating objectives, Congress identified additional principal trade
negotiating objectives. Id. 19 U.S.C. § 2901(b) (1988 & Supp. V 1993). These objec-
tives included: (1) to provide a more effective and expeditious dispute settlement
mechanism; (2) to enhance the status of the GATT; (3) to obtain broader application
of the principle of transparency and clarification of the costs and benefits of trade pol-
icy actions; and (4) to ensure that developing countries promote economic develop-
ment by assuming the fullest possible measure of responsibility for achieving and main-
taining an open international trading system. Id.
111. 58 Fed. Reg. 67263-67267 (1993).
112. Id.
113. 19 U.S.C. § 2155(a) (1988 & Supp. V 1993). Section 2155(a) requires the
President to seek information and advice from representative elements of the private
sector and the non-Federal government sector with respect to the development, imple-
mentation, and administration of U.S. trade policy. Id.
114. INTERGOVERNMENTAL POLICY ADVISORY COMMITTrEE, REPORT ON THE URUGUAY
ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS (Jan. 11, 1994). The Intergovernmental
Policy Advisory Committee on Trade was created pursuant to 19 U.S.C.
§ 2114(c) (2) (A)(ii) (1988 & Supp. V 1993). This section authorizes the President, as
he deems appropriate, to establish an intergovernmental policy advisory committee on
trade to serve as a principal forum in which state and local governments may consult
with the federal government on trade policy matters. 19 U.S.C. § 2114(c)(2)(A) (1988
& Supp. V 1993).
115. ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON TRADE POLICY AND NEGOTIATIONS, REPORT ON THE
URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS (Jan. 15, 1994). The Advisory
Committee for Trade Policy and Negotiations was established pursuant to 19 U.S.C.
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comments from numerous private sector advisory committees.1 1 6
These advisory committees examined broad policy level issues as
well as narrow technical and sectoral concerns.1 17
On September 27, 1994, President Clinton transmitted
House Bill 5110 ("Uruguay Round Agreements Act" or "Uruguay
Act") to Congress for formal consideration.I 8 The Bill was con-
sidered by the House Committee on Ways and Means on Sep-
tember 28, 1994, and was approved by a vote of thirty-five to
three. 9 After brief floor hearings, the Uruguay Round Agree-
ments Act was approved by the House of Representatives on No-
vember 29, 1994, and the Senate on December 1, 1994.121 Presi-
§ 2155(b)(1), which authorizes the President to create such a committee to provide
overall policy advice on negotiation, development, implementation, and administration
of trade agreements. 19 U.S.C. § 2155(b)(1) (1988 & Supp. 1993).
116. The policy advisory committees were established pursuant to 19 U.S.C.
§ 2155(c)(1) which authorizes the President to establish individual general policy advi-
sory committees for industry, labor, agriculture, services, investment, defense, and
other interests, as appropriate, to provide general policy advice on trade matters. 19
U.S.C. § 2155(c)(1). In addition, section 2155(c)(2) authorizes the President to estab-
lish such sectoral or functional advisory committees as may be appropriate. 19 U.S.C.
§ 2155(c) (2). Such committees shall be representative of all industry, labor, agricul-
tural, or service interests in the sector or functional areas concerned. Id. Representa-
tive committees were established for the following industries: Agriculture, Defense, In-
dustry, Investment, Labor, and Services. In addition, numerous sectoral or functional
advisory committees were established pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 2155(c)(2). 19 U.S.C.
§ 2155(c) (2).
117. See DEFENSE POLICY ADVISORY COMMITTEE TRADE, REPORT ON THE URUGUAY
ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS (Jan. 10, 1994); AGRICULTURE TECHNI-
CAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE, REPORT ON THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE
NEGOTIATIONS (Jan. 10, 1994); LABOR ADVISORY COMMITTEE, REPORT ON THE URUGUAY
ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS (Jan. 11, 1994); INDUSTRY SECTOR AND
FUNCTIONAL ADVISORY COMMITTEES, REPORT ON THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL
TRADE NEGOTIATIONS (Jan. 11, 1994); SERVICES POLICY ADVISORY COMMITTEE, REPORT ON
THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS (Jan. 12, 1994); AGRICUL-
TURE ADVISORY COMMITTEE, REPORT ON THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE
NEGOTIATIONS (Jan. 13, 1994); INDUSTRY POLICY ADVISORY COMMITTEE, REPORT ON THE
URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS (Jan. 14, 1994); INVESTMENT
POLICY ADVISORY COMMITTEE, REPORT ON THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE
NEGOTIATIONS (Jan. 15, 1994).
118. H.R. 5110, 103rd Cong., 2d Sess. (1994). House Bill 5110 was introduced
September 27, 1994 as "an Act to approve and implement the trade agreements con-
cluded in the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations." Id.
119. The Committee on Energy and Commerce reported the bill without recom-
mendation by a voice vote. The Committees on Agriculture, Education and Labor,
Foreign Affairs, Government Operations, Judiciary, and Rules did not act on the bill.
Schedule for Week of November 28, 1994, Congressional Press Releases, Nov. 28, 1994.
120. The House voted 288 to 146 in favor of approval. Helen Dewar, Senate Ap-
proves GATT on Big Bipartisan Vote, WASH. POST, Dec. 2, 1994, at Al. The Senate vote
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dent Clinton signed the legislation on December 8, 1994.
This section examines several elements of the Uruguay
Round Agreements Act. It reviews the provisions concerning im-
plementation of the Uruguay Round Agreements. It examines
the provisions that describe the implications of the Agreements
on federal and state law. It also reviews the provisions that estab-
lish consultation procedures between the Federal and State Gov-
ernments. Finally, this section examines the provisions in the
Uruguary Round Agreements Act concerning congressional re-
view of U.S. participation in the Uruguay Round Agreements.
A. The Implementation of the Uruguay Round Agreements
The U.S. Congress approved the Uruguay Round Agree-
ments Act 2 1 pursuant to § 1103 of the Omnibus Trade and
Competitiveness Act of 1988122 and § 151 of the Trade Act of
1974.123 In the implementing legislation, Congress authorized
the President and other appropriate officers of the U.S. Govern-
ment to issue such regulations as may be necessary to ensure that
any provision of the Uruguay Act is appropriately implemented
when the Uruguay Round Agreements enter into force.
Section 122(A) of the Uruguay Act provides that in the im-
plementation of the Uruguay Round Agreements and in the
functioning of the WTO, it is the objective of the United States
to ensure that the Ministerial Conference and the General
Council continue the practice of decision-making by consensus
followed under the GATT 1947, and as required by Article IX of
the WTO Agreement. 12 4 In furtherance of this objective, if the
action would substantially affect the rights or obligations of the
was 76 to 24 in favor of approval. Prior to its vote on the Act, the Senate passed a
budget waiver to overcome objections that the agreement broke budget rules because
revenue lost from tariff cuts was not offset by spending reductions. The budget waiver
was approved by a vote of 68 to 32. Congress was originally scheduled to vote on the
Uruguay Round Agreements Act in November 1994. Pursuant to the fast-track legisla-
tion, however, Committee chairmen are granted 45 days to review the proposed legisla-
tion. 19 U.S.C. § 2901 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). Senate Commerce Committee Chair-
man Ernest Hollings took advantage of this procedural right to schedule a series of
hearings in order to delay the vote until after the November 1994 elections. As a result,
the House also postponed formal consideration of the Act until after the November
elections.
121. 19 U.S.C. § 3501 (1994).
122. 19 U.S.C. § 2903 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
123. 19 U.S.C. § 2191 (1988 & Sup. V 1993).
124. Uruguay Round Agreements Act § 122(a), 19 U.S.C. § 3532 (1994).
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United States under the wTO Agreement, or under another
Multilateral Trade Agreement, or potentially entails a change in
federal or state law, the U.S. Trade Representative is required to
consult with the appropriate congressional committee before
any vote is taken by the Ministerial Conference or the General
Council 125 In addition, the Trade Representative is required to
submit a report to the appropriate congressional committees
describing the nature and scope of the action and the U.S. re-
sponse. 12 6 The Trade Representative is required to consult with
the appropriate congressional committees following the submis-
sion of his report. 7
In addition, § 126 of the Uruguay Act requires the Trade
Representative to seek Ministerial Conference and General
Council adoption of procedures that will ensure broader appli-
cation of the principle of transparency and clarification of the
costs and benefits of trade policy actions.1 28 These principles
should be applied through the observance of open and equita-
ble procedures in trade matters by the Ministerial Conference
and the General Council, and by the dispute settlement panels
and the Appellate Body."
B. The Implications of the Uruguay Round Agreements on Federal
and State Law
Section 102(a) of the Uruguay Act reviews the implications
of the Uruguay Round Agreements on federal law.1 30 Section
102(a) (1) provides that no provision of the Uruguay Round
Agreements shall have any effect if it is inconsistent with any law
of the United States.' 3 ' Section 102(a) (2) provides that the im-
plementing legislation shall not be construed to amend or mod-
ify any U.S. law, including any law relating to the protection of
human, animal, or plant life or health; the protection of the en-
125. Uruguay Round Agreements Act § 122(b), 19 U.S.C. § 3532 (1994). The
term "appropriate congressional committee" means the House Committee on Ways and
Means, the Senate Committee on Finance, and any other congressional committees
that have jurisdiction involving the matter. Id. The term "state law" includes any law of
a political subdivision of a state. Id. § 102(b), 19 U.S.C. § 3512 (1994).
126. Id. § 122(c)(1), 19 U.S.C. § 3532.
127. Id.
128. Id. § 126, 19 U.S.C. § 3536-37.
129. Id.
130. Id. § 102, 19 U.S.C. § 3512.
131. Id. § 102(a)(1), 19 U.S.C. § 3512.
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vironment; or the protection of worker safety. 13 2 It adds that the
implementing legislation shall not be construed to limit any au-
thority conferred under any law of the United States, including
§ 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, unless specifically provided for in
the implementing legislation.1 33
If a dispute settlement panel or the Appellate Body finds
that a regulation or practice of the United States is inconsistent
with the Uruguay Round Agreements, § 123(G) provides that
such regulation or practice may not be amended, rescinded, or
otherwise modified until certain procedures are imple-
mented.1 3 4  First, the appropriate congressional committees
must be consulted. 13 5 Second, the Trade Representative must
seek advice regarding the modification presented by the relevant
private sector advisory committees.13 6 Third, the head of the rel-
evant department or agency must provide an opportunity for
public comment by publishing in the Federal Register the pro-
posed modification and the explanation for the modification."3 7
Fourth, the Trade Representative must submit a report to the
appropriate congressional committees describing the proposed
modification, the reasons for the modification, and a summary
of the advice obtained from the private sector advisory commit-
tees. 13  Fifth, the Trade Representative and the head of the rele-
vant federal department or agency must consult with the appro-
priate congressional committees on the proposed contents of
the final rule or other modification.3 9 Sixth, the final rule or
other modification must be published in the Federal Register. 4 '
Any resulting modification may not go into effect until sixty days
following the date on which consultations began, unless the
President determines that an earlier date is in the national inter-
132. Id. § 102(a) (2), 19 U.S.C. § 3512.
133. Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. § 2101 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). Section 301 of
the Trade Act of 1974 authorizes the Trade Representative to impose sanctions against
unfair trade practices. Id. 19 U.S.C. § 2171 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
134. Uruguay Round Agreements Act § 123(g) (1), 19 U.S.C. § 3 5 3 3 (g) (1). These
procedures do not apply to any regulation or practice of the International Trade Com-
mission. 19 U.S.C. § 3533(g) (4).
135. Uruguay Round Agreements Act § 123(g)(1), 19 U.S.C. § 3533(g) (1) (A).
136. § 3533(g)(1)(B).
137. Id. § 123(g)(1), 19 U.S.C. § 3533(g)(1)(C).
138. Id. § 123(g)(1), 19 U.S.C. § 3533(g)(1)(D).
139. Id. § 123(g) (1), 19 U.S.C. § 3533(g)(1)(E).
140. Id. § 123(g)(1), 19 U.S.C. § 3533(g) (1) (F).
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est. 4 ' During this sixty-day period, the House Committee on
Ways and Means and the Senate Committee on Finance may
vote to indicate their position with regards to the proposed mod-
ification. 42 Such a vote, however, is not binding on the depart-
ment implementing the modification. 14 3
Section 102(b) of the Uruguay Act reviews the implications
of the Uruguay Round Agreements on state law.' 4 4 Section
102(b) (2) (A) provides that no state law, or the application of
such a state law, may be declared invalid as to any person or
circumstance on the ground that the provision or application is
inconsistent with any of the Uruguay Round Agreements, except
in an action brought by the United States for the purpose of
declaring such law or application invalid.145  Section
102(b) (2) (B) describes the procedures governing such actions
brought by the United States against a state or political subdivi-
sion. 146 A report by a dispute settlement panel or the Appellate
Body regarding a state law or the law of any political subdivision
shall not be considered as binding or otherwise accorded defer-
ence. Rather, the United States has the burden of proving that
the law is inconsistent with the Uruguay Round Agreements.
Any state whose interests may be impaired or impeded in the
action shall have the unconditional right to intervene in the ac-
tion as a party.' 47 If a state law is declared invalid, it shall not be
deemed to have been invalid in its application during any period
before the court's judgment becomes final and all timely appeals
of such judgment are exhausted. 48 Section 102(b) (2) (C) pro-
vides that at least thirty days before the United States brings such
an action against a state or a political subdivision, the Trade Rep-
resentative must provide a report to the House Committee on
Ways and Means and the Senate Committee on Finance describ-
ing the proposed action and efforts by the Trade Representative
141. Id. § 123(g)(1), 19 U.S.C. § 3533(g) (2).
142. Id. § 123(g)(1), 19 U.S.C. § 3533(g)(3) (1994).
143. Id.
144. Id. § 102(b), 19 U.S.C. § 3512(b) (1994).
145. Id. § 102(b)(2)(A), 19 U.S.C. § 3512(a)(1) (1994).
146. Id. § 102(b) (2) (B), 19 U.S.C. § 3512(b).
147. Id. § 102(b) (2) (B) (iii), 19 U.S.C. § 3512(b). The United States is, however,
entitled to amend its complaint to include a claim or cross-claim concerning the law of
a state that intervenes. Id.
148. Id. § 102(b)(2)(B)(iv) 19 U.S.C. § 3512(b)(2)(B)(iv).
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to resolve the matter with the state by other means. 149 The
Trade Representative is then required to consult with the com-
mittees before the action is brought.
Finally, § 102(c)(1) of the Uruguay Act provides that no
person, other than the United States, shall have any cause of ac-
tion or defense under any of the Uruguay Round Agreements or
by virtue of congressional approval of the Uruguay Round
Agreements. 5 ° In ,addition, no person, other than the United
States, may challenge, in any action brought under any provision
of law, any action or inaction by any department, agency, or
other instrumentality of the United States, any state, or any polit-
ical subdivision of a state on the ground that such action or inac-
tion is inconsistent with the Uruguay Round Agreements. Sec-
tion 102(c) (2) provides that it is the intention of Congress to
occupy the field with respect to any cause of action or defense
under or in connection with any of the Uruguay Round Agree-
ments.1 51 Read together, these provisions preclude any person,
other than the United States, from bringing an action against
any state or political subdivision or raising any defense to the
application of state law under or in connection with any of the
Uruguay Round Agreements.
C. The Establishment of Consultation Procedures
The Uruguay Round Agreements Act establishes extensive
consultation procedures between the Trade Representative,
Congress, and state governments. The purpose of these consul-
tation procedures is to provide oversight of U.S. participation in
the Uruguay Round Agreements and to integrate Congress and
state governments into the decision-making process.
The Trade Representative is required to consult with the ap-
propriate congressional committees throughout the entire dis-
pute settlement process. Thus, Uruguay Act § 123(D) requires
that the Trade Representative consult with the appropriate con-
gressional committees following the establishment of a dispute
settlement panel that is to consider the consistency of a federal
or state law with any of the Uruguay Round Agreements.15 2 Sec-
149. Id. § 102(b) (2) (B) (iii), 19 U.S.C. § 3512(b)(2)(C) (1994).
150. Id. § 102(c)(1), 19 U.S.C. § 3512(c)(1) (1994).
151. Id. § 102(c) (2), 19 U.S.C. § 3512(c) (2) (1994).
152. Id. § 123(D), 19 U.S.C. § 3533(d) (1994).
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tion 123(E) requires the Trade Representative to consult with
the appropriate congressional committees if an appeal is filed
from a panel report.15 Section 123(F) requires the Trade Rep-
resentative to promptly consult with the appropriate congres-
sional committees following the circulation of a report of a panel
or of the Appellate Body."'
Similarly, § 127(A) of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act
provides that whenever the United States is a party before a dis-
pute settlement panel, the Trade Representative is required to
consult with the appropriate congressional committees, the peti-
tioner (if any), and the relevant private sector advisory commit-
tees at each stage of the proceedings.155 The Trade Representa-
tive shall also consider the views of representatives of appropri-
ate interested private sector and non-governmental
organizations concerning the matter. Section 127(B) (1) re-
quires the Trade Representative to publish a notice in the Fed-
eral Register following its request to establish a dispute settle-
ment panel or after receiving a request from another WTO
Member for the establishment of a panel. 56 Section 127(b) (2)
requires the Trade Representative to take into account any ad-
vice received from the appropriate congressional committees,
relevant private sector advisory committees, and written com-
ments from the public in preparing U.S. submissions to the
panel or Appellate Body.1 5 7 Section 127(c) requires the Trade
Representative to publicize all non-confidential documents
presented by the United States in dispute settlement proceed-
ings.158 The Trade Representative is also required to request
that other parties authorize the disclosure of their written sub-
missions to the public. The Trade Representative shall make
each report of the dispute settlement panel or the Appellate
Body available to the public. Section 127(d) requires that the
Trade Representative request each party in a dispute settlement
proceeding to provide non-confidential summaries of its non-
153. Id. § 123(E), 19 U.S.C. § 3533(e) (1994).
154. Id. § 123(F), 19 U.S.C. § 3533 (1994).
155. Id. § 127(A), 19 U.S.C. § 3537 (1994).
156. Id. § 127(b)(1), 19 U.S.C. § 3537 (1994). The notice shall identify the initial
parties to the dispute, set forth the major issues and the legal basis of the complaint,
identify specific measures cited in the request for establishment of the panel, and seek
written comments from the public concerning the issues raised by the dispute. Id.
157. Id. § 127(b) (2), 19 U.S.C. § 3537 (1994).
158. Id. § 127(c), 19 U.S.C. § 3537 (1994).
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confidential written submissions. 1 9 These summaries shall then
be made available to the public. Section 127(e) requires the
Trade Representative to maintain a public file on each dispute
settlement proceeding to which the United States is a party.16 °
In addition, § 102(b) (1) (A) requires the President, through
the Intergovernmental Policy Advisory Committees on Trade, to
consult with state governments for the purpose of achieving con-
formity between state laws and practices and the Uruguay Round
Agreements.1 61 Section 102(b) (1) (B) requires the Trade Repre-
sentative to establish a federal-state consultation process for ad-
dressing issues relating to the Uruguay Round Agreements that
directly relate to, or that will potentially have a direct effect on,
the States.1 62 This consultation process requires that the States
be informed on a continuing basis of matters that directly relate
to, or that potentially have a direct impact on, the States. The
States must be provided with an opportunity to submit informa-
tion and advice concerning matters that affect them. The Trade
Representative is required to take this information and advice
into account when formulating U.S. positions regarding such
matters. 
163
Section 102(b) (1) (C) establishes cooperation procedures
between states and the Federal Government when a WTO Mem-
ber requests consultations with the United States concerning the
consistency of a state law with the Uruguay Round Agree-
ments. 1" The Trade Representative is required to notify the
governor of the affected state and the chief legal officer of the
jurisdiction whose law is the subject of the WTO consultation no
later than seven days after the request is received. In addition,
the Trade Representative must consult with representatives of
the affected state regarding the matter no later than thirty days
after receiving the WTO consultation request. The Trade Repre-
sentative is required to ensure that the affected state is involved
159. Id. § 127(d), 19 U.S.C. § 3537 (1994).
160. Id. § 127(e), 19 U.S.C. § 3537 (1994).
161. Id. § 102(b)(1)(A), 19 U.S.C. § 3512 (1994).
162. Id. § 102(b)(1)(B), 19 U.S.C. § 3512 (1994). The Federal Advisory Commit-
tee Act does not apply to this consultation process. Id.
163. Id. § 102(b)(1)(B)(iii), 19 U.S.C. § 3512 (1994). The public file must in-
clude all U.S. submissions in the proceeding, a listing of any submissions to the Trade
Representative from the public with respect to the proceedings, and the report of the
dispute settlement panel or the Appellate Body. Id.
164. Id. § 102(b)(1)(C), 19 U.S.C. § 3512 (1994).
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in the development of the U.S. position at each stage of the con-
sultations and each subsequent stage of the dispute settlement
proceedings. If a dispute settlement panel or the Appellate
Body determines that a state law is inconsistent with the Uruguay
Round Agreements, the Trade Representative is required to con-
sult with the affected state in an effort to develop a mutually
agreeable response to the adverse report. Interestingly,
§ 102(b) (1) (D) also requires the Trade Representative to notify
and solicit the views of states when the United States makes a
request for consultations under the Dispute Settlement Under-
standing, regarding a sub-central governmental measure of an-
other WTO Member.165
D. Review of U.S. Participation in the WTO
The Uruguay Round Agreements Act establishes several
procedures for reviewing U.S. participation in the WTO. These
provisions supplement the procedures established for reviewing
U.S. participation in the dispute settlement process.
Section 123 (A) requires the President to conduct an annual
review of the WTO panel roster.' 66 Under § 123(B), the Trade
Representative is required to ensure that the persons appointed
to the WTO panel roster are well-qualified. In addition,
§ 123(C) requires the Trade Representative to seek the establish-
ment by the General Council and the DSB of rules to govern
conflicts of interest by persons serving on panels and Members
of the Appellate Body.
Section 124 requires the Trade Representative to submit an
annual report to Congress describing the activities of the
WTO.' 6 7 The report must describe the major activities, work
programs, budget, and personnel information of the WTO. It
must describe each proceeding or report that was initiated dur-
ing that fiscal year regarding federal or state law. It must also
describe the status of consultations with any state whose law has
been the subject of a panel or Appellate Body report that is ad-
165. Id. § 102(b)(1)(D), 19 U.S.C. § 3512 (1994). The Trade Representative is re-
quired to take such action at least 30 days before making the request for consultations.
Id. In exigent circumstances, however, this requirement shall not apply, in which case
the Trade Representative shall notify the appropriate representatives of each state not
later than three days after making the consultation request. Id.
166. Id. § 123(a), 19 U.S.C. § 3533(a) (1994).
167. Id. § 124, 19 U.S.C. § 3534 (1994).
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verse to the United States. Finally, the Trade Representative
must describe any progress achieved in increasing the trans-
parency of the proceedings of the Ministerial Conference and
the General Council, and of dispute settlement proceedings con-
ducted pursuant to the Dispute Settlement Understanding.
Section 125(A) provides that five years after the WTO
Agreement enters into force with respect to the United States,
and after every five-year period thereafter, the annual reports re-
quired under § 124 shall include an analysis of the effects of the
WTO Agreement on the United States, the costs and benefits to
the United States of participation in the WTO, and the value of
its continued participation in the WTo.1 68
Finally, the implementing legislation establishes procedures
for Congress to seek U.S. withdrawal from the Uruguay Round
Agreements. Congress may withdraw its approval of the WTO
Agreement by enacting ajoint Resolution pursuant to the proce-
dures set forth in Uruguay Act § 125(B).169 Joint Resolutions
may be introduced by any .Member of Congress. The procedures
set forth in § 152 of the Trade Act of 1974 apply to these Joint
Resolutions. 170 Congress must adopt and transmit the joint Res-
olution to the President within ninety days of Congressional re-
ceipt of the five-year review report prepared by the Trade Repre-
sentative pursuant to § 125(a). 7' If the President vetoes the
Joint Resolution, both the House of Representatives and the
168. Id. § 125(a), 19 U.S.C. § 3535 (1994).
169. Id. § 125(b), 19 U.S.C. § 3535 (1994). The term "Joint Resolution" refers to a
Joint Resolution of the two Houses of Congress. Id. For Congress to withdraw its ap-
proval of the WTO Agreement, the Joint Resolution must contain the following lan-
guage: "That the Congress withdraws its approval, provided under Section 101 (A) of
the Uruguay Round Agreements Act, of the WTO Agreement as defined in section 2 (9)
of that Act." Id.
170. Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. § 2192(b),(d),(e),(f) (1994). See 19 U.S.C.
§ 2192 (setting forth fast-track procedures for trade legislation).
171. Uruguay Round Agreements Act § 125(A), 19 U.S.C. § 3535 (1994). Section
125 provides that it is not improper for the Senate to consider ajoint Resolution unless
it has been reported by the Committee on Finance or the Committee has been dis-
charged for failing to report by the close of the 45th day after its introduction. Id.
Similarly, it is not in order for the House to consider a Joint Resolution unless it has
been reported by the Committee on Ways and Means or the Committee has been dis-
charged for failing to'report by the close of the 45th day after its introduction. Uruguay
Round Agreements Act § 125(b) (2), 19 U.S.C. § 3535(c) (2) (D) (1994). In addition, it
is not in order in either the House or the Senate to consider a joint resolution, other
than a Joint Resolution received from the other House, if that House has previously
adopted a Joint Resolution under this section. Id.
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Senate must vote to override the veto on or before the later of
the last day of the ninety-day period, or the last day of the fif-
teen-day period beginning on the date that Congress receives
the President's veto message. 172 This provision was enacted by
Congress as an exercise of its rule-making power.173 Further-
more, Congress fully recognized the constitutional right to
change these rules at any time. 174
III. THE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT REVIEW COMMISSION
Following transmittal of the Uruguay Round Agreements
Act to Congress, the Clinton Administration began negotiations
with congressional leaders to facilitate passage of the implement-
ing legislation. These negotiations were designed to allay fears
about the Uruguay Round Agreements and their possible effects
on U.S. sovereignty. These concerns focused particularly on the
operation of the dispute settlement mechanism and the panel
process. 175 As the Senate minority leader, Senator Robert Dole's
support for the Uruguay Round Agreements Act was critical to
its passage in Congress. Consequently, the Clinton Administra-
tion worked with Senator Dole to develop additional procedures
for the protection of U.S. sovereignty.
On November 25, 1994, the Office of the Trade Representa-
tive issued a press release announcing that the Administration
had agreed to support legislation to establish a WTO Dispute
Settlement Review Commission ("Commission") .176 The Com-
172. Uruguay Round Agreements Act § 125(b) (2) (ii), 19 U.S.C. § 3535(b) (2) (ii)
(1994).
173. Id. § 125(d)(1) (1994).
174. Id. § 125(d)(2) (1994).
175. See Bob Dole, GA7T Not Perfect But Sees Improvement, Congressional Press Re-
leases, November 23, 1994. Senator Robert Dole stated:
My major concern was that the GATT agreement establishes a new dispute
settlement process that could seriously harm U.S. interests. I was concerned
that WTO dispute settlement panels in Geneva could rule against the U.S.,
and even if that ruling was clearly wrong, we could have been required to
accept that bad ruling, and maybe even pay penalties to other countries.
Id.
176. Office of the United States Trade Representative, Documents Relating to the
Agreement Between the Clinton Administration and Sen. Robert Dole Concerning the
Uruguay Round Agreements, Issued by the White House Nov. 23, 1994, Daily Executive
Reports, Nov. 25, 1994, at 225; Documents Relating to the Clinton Administration's Agreement
with Sen. Robert Dole Concerning the Uruguay Round Agreement, 11 INT'L. TRADE REP. 1865
(1994) [hereinafter Documents Concerning the Uruguay Round Agreement].
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mission would consist of five federal appellate court judges, ap-
pointed by the President in consultation with congressional lead-
ers and the Chairmen and Ranking Members of the House Com-
mitte on Ways and Means and the Senate Committee on
Finance. Each Commissioner would serve a four-year term sub-
ject to renewal. Provisions would be made for the appropriate
staggering of the Commissioner's terms.
The Commission would be empowered to review all final
WTO dispute settlement reports issued by either a panel or the
Appellate Body to determine whether the final report is adverse
to the United States. 177 In each case, the Commission would de-
termine whether the panel or Appellate Body:
1. Demonstrably exceeded its authority or terms of reference
or, where the matter concerned the Uruguay Round An-
tidumping Agreement, failed to apply Article 17.6 concerning
standard of review;
2. Added to the obligations or diminished the rights the
United States assumed under the pertinent Uruguay Round
agreement;
3. Acted arbitrarily or capriciously, engaged in misconduct,
or demonstrably departed from the procedures specified for
panels or the appellate body in the agreements; and whether
4. The action in 1, 2, or 3 materially affects the outcome of
the report.
178
The Federal Government and all interested parties would
be entitled to address the Commission. The Commission would
issue a determination within 120 days after the report is adopted.
Three votes would be required for an affirmative determination.
Following the issuance of an affirmative determination by
the Commission, any Member of Congress would be able to in-
troduce a Joint Resolution requiring the President to negotiate
new dispute settlement rules that would address and correct the
problem identified by the Commission. The resolution would be
privileged. It would be discharged from the House Committee
on Ways and Means and the Senate Committee on Finance
under the same procedures provided in § 125 of the implement-
177. Documents Concerning the Uruguay Round Agreement, supra note 176, at 1865. See
Letter from Michael Kantor, United States Trade Representative to U.S. Senator Robert
Dole (Nov. 23, 1994). Id.
178. Documents Concerning the Uruguay Round Agreement, supra note 176, at 1865.
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ing legislation. Floor action would be expedited under the same
procedures.
If the Commission issues three affirmative determinations
in any five-year period, any Member of Congress would be able
to introduce a Joint Resolution to disapprove U.S. participation
in the WTO under the same procedures set forth in § 125 of the
implementing legislation. If the resolution is enacted by Con-
gress and signed by the President, the United States would com-
mence withdrawal from the WTO Agreement.
According to the Clinton Administration, the goals of the
Dispute Settlement Review Commission are straightforward: (1)
to assure that the dispute settlement process is accountable; (2)
that it is a fair process; and (3) that the dispute settlement pro-
cess works as the Administration expects it to work. 79 While the
Administration was confident that the dispute settlement process
would work fairly and that the concerns expressed by many
would not materialize, the Commission would provide a "fail-
safe" device were the panels to exceed their authority.
IV. THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND
AGREEMENTS ON U.S. SOVEREIGNTY
The Uruguay Round Agreements Act and the proposed Dis-
pute Settlement Review Commission were designed to alleviate
fears concerning the implications of the Uruguay Round Agree-
ments on U.S. sovereignty. The purpose of this final section is to
examine the success of the U.S. legislation.
A. International Agreements and the United States
As a preliminary matter, it is necessary to understand the
general implications of international agreements in the United
States. Both treaties and congressional-executive agreements
constitute valid forms of international agreements.180 Indeed,
179. Office of the United States Trade Representative, Documents Relating to the
Agreement Between the Clinton Administration and Sen. Robert Dole (R-KAN) Con-
cerning the Uruguay Round Agreement, Issued by the White House Nov. 23, 1994,
Daily Executive Reports, Nov. 25, 1994, at 225.
180. U.S CONSr. art. II, § 2. Section 2 authorizes the President "by and with the
Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Sena-
tors present concur." Id. Congressional-Executive agreements are authorized under
the inherent and plenary powers of both the President and Congress. Id. In Dames &
Moore v. Regan, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld an Executive Agreement with Iran that
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recent practice suggests that the particular form of an interna-
tional agreement has no significant implication on its domestic
application. 8 1 A wide range of international obligations, includ-
ing the GATT 1947,182 SALT I,18 and the North American Free
Trade Agreement 184 ("NAFTA") were entered under congres-
sional-executive agreements.18 5 Thus, the difference appears to
be one of form and not substance.1 86 The next two sub-sections
was negotiated by President Carter in order to obtain the release of America hostages in
Iran. 453 U.S. 654 (1981). Writing for the Court,Justice Rehnquist validated the agree-
ment by referring to both specific and implied congressional authorization of such ac-
tion. Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 674.
Executive agreements are also used to conclude international agreements. See
United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937). In United States v. Belmont, the Supreme
Court upheld the authority of the President to enter international agreements without
the consent of Congress. Belmont, 301 U.S. at 330. Justice Sutherland's majority opin-
ion indicated that "an international compact ... is not always a treaty which requires
the participation of the Senate. There are many such compacts, of which a protocol, a
modus vivendi, a postal convention, and agreements like that now under consideration
are illustrations." Id. See Bruce Ackerman and David Golove, Is NAFTA Constitutional?,
108 HARv. L. REV. 801 (1995) (describing historical process which came to recognize
legitimacy of congressional-executive agreements).
181. See Geoffrey Watson, The Death of Treaty, 55 Ot-o ST. L.J. 781, 830-36 (1994);
Jack Weiss, The Approval of Arms Control Agreements as Congressional-Executive Agreements, 38
UCLA L. REv. 1533 (1991); Myres McDougal & Asher Lans, Treaties and Congressional-
Executive or Presidential Agreements: Interchangeable Instruments of National Policy, 54 YALE
L.J. 181, 234 (1945).
The result is that our constitutional law today makes available two parallel and
completely interchangeable procedures, wholly applicable to the same subject
matters and of identical domestic and international legal consequences, for
the consummation of intergovernmental agreements. In addition to the
treaty-making procedure ... there is what may be called an "agreement-mak-
ing procedure," which may operate either under the combined powers of the
Congress and the President or in some instances under the powers of the
President alone.
Id.
182. GATr, supra note 2, 61 Stat. A3, 55 U.N.T.S. 187.
183. Interim Agreement on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of
Strategic Offensive Arms, May 26, 1972, U.S.-U.S.S.R., 23 U.S.T. 3462, T.I.A.S. No. 7504.
184. Canada-Mexico-United States: North American Free Trade Agreement
[Done at Washington on December 8 and 17, 1992, at Ottawa on December 11 and 17,
1992, and at Mexico City on December 14 and 17, 1992], 32 I.L.M. 605 (1993).
185. See Ronald Brand, The Status of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade in
United States Domestic Law, 26 STAN. J. INT'L L. 479, 497-502 (1990); John Jackson, The
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade in United States Domestic Law, 66 MICH. L. RExv. 250,
312 (1967).
186. But see Testimony of Professor Laurence Tribe before the Senate Committee
on Commerce, Science and Transportation, supra note 7. This conclusion is by no
means uncontroverted. In testimony before the Senate on October 18, 1994, Harvard
Law School professor Laurence Tribe argued that fast-track procedures were inappro-
priate and that the Uruguay Round Agreements should be submitted to the Senate as a
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will review the implications of international agreements on fed-
eral and state law.
1. International Agreements and Federal Law
International agreements play an integral role in the Ameri-
can legal system.187 In The Paquete Habana, the U.S. Supreme
Court identified the role of international law in the United
treaty pursuant to Article II, Section 2 of the Constitution. Id. at 297. He argued that
the content and import of the Uruguay Round Agreements required that they be sub-
mitted under the Treaty Clause of the Constitution. Id. Specifically, the implications of
the Uruguay Round Agreements on state sovereignty "so deeply implicate the normal
lawmaking process of our political system that they are impermissible if the safeguards
of the Treaty Clause are not followed." Id. at 302.
Professor Tribe's criticism of the use of fast-track procedures for the Uruguay
Round Agreements Act rather than the Treaty procedures in Article II of the Constitu-
tion is based upon the notion that the content and importance of certain international
agreements requires the use of the constitutionally mandated procedures for treaties.
Similarly, Professor Anne-Marie Slaughter has argued that the Treaty Clause's provision
for supermajority approval is an independent guarantee that particularly important in-
ternational agreements will be subject to serious deliberation and will be based upon
strong national consensus. Id. at 286-90.
In contrast, Yale Law School professor Bruce Ackerman testified that the Congres-
sional-Executive agreement serves the principles of constitutional democracy far better
than the limited procedures provided in the Treaty Clause. GATTImplementingLegisla-
tion, 1994: Hearings on S. 2467 Before the Committee on ommerce, Science, and Transporta-
tion, 103rd Cong., 2nd Sess. 312 (1994) (statement of Bruce Ackerman, Professor, Yale
University Law School). Professor Ackerman argued that the use of Congressional-Ex-
ecutive agreements has increased significantly over the past 50 years and evinces con-
gressional cooperation in the conduct of international relations. Id. at 314.
Professor Tribe qualified his position in a subsequent memorandum to congres-
sional leaders, Trade Representative Mickey Kantor and Assistant Attorney General Wal-
ter Dellinger on November 28, 1994. Gary Yerkey, Senate Approves GATT Trade Bill, 11
INT'L. TRADE REP. 1874 (1994). He indicated:
Although I continue to believe that the constitutional concerns that I have
previously raised are deeply important, I cannot say with certainty that my
prior conclusions should necessarily be adopted by others or are ones to
which I will adhere in the end after giving the matter the further thought that
it deserves.
Id. Professor Tribe indicated that the Administration's constitutional arguments that
the Uruguay Round Agreements are not a treaty "are both powerful and plausible," and
added that "it would therefore be incorrect to quote or to rely upon my earlier contrary
views without adding this important qualification." See Nancy Dunne, GATT Reforms
Win Strong Howe Backing, FIN. TimEs, Nov. 30, 1994, at 4.
: 187. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 111 (1986). The Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the
United States provides that "[i]nternational law and international agreements of the
United States are law of the United States and supreme over the law of the several
States." Id.
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States. 188 In a frequently cited passage, the Court announced
that "international law is part of our law, and must be ascer-
tained and administered by the courts of justice of appropriate
jurisdiction, as often as questions of right depending upon it are
duly presented for this determination." 189 As Louis Henkin has
noted:
[T]here is now general agreement that international law, as
incorporated into domestic law in the United States, is fed-
eral, not state law; that cases arising under international law
are 'cases arising under.., the Laws of the United States' and
therefore are within the judicial power of the United States
are under article III of the Constitution; that principles of in-
ternational law as incorporated in the lawof the United States
are 'Laws of the United States' and supreme under article VI;
that international law, therefore, is to be determined inde-
pendently by the federal courts, and ultimately by the United
States Supreme Court, with its determination binding on the
state courts; and that a determination of international law by
a state court is a federal question subject to review by the
Supreme Court.1 90
International agreements are considered equivalent to fed-
eral law under the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution. Arti-
cle VI, clause 2 provides, in pertinent part, that " [t] his Constitu-
tion, and the Laws of the United States... and all Treaties made
... shall be the supreme Law of the Land." 91 As a result, inter-
national agreements have the same domestic authority as federal
statutes. Both are considered the supreme law of the land.192
188. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900).
189. Id. at 714.
190. Louis Henkin, International Law as Law in the United States, 82 MICH. L. RE,.
1555, 1559-60 (1984).
191. U.S. CONsr. art. VI(2). RESTATEMENT (THIRD) oF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS
LAw OF THE UNITED STATES, § 111 cmt. d. (1986). Comment d provides that
"[i]ntemational agreements of the United States other than treaties and customary in-
ternational law, while not mentioned explicitly in the Supremacy Clause, are also fed-
eral law and as such are supreme over State law." Id.
192. See Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581 (1889). In the Chinese Exclusion
Case, the Supreme Court noted that "by the constitution, laws made in pursuance
thereof, and treaties made under the authority of the United States, are both declared
to be the supreme law of the land." Id. at 600. See Louis Henkin, The Constitution and
United States Sovereignty: A Century of Chinese Exclusion and its Progeny, 100 HARV. L. REv.
853 (1987); see also Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Franklin Mint Corp., 466 U.S. 243, 252
(1984); Weinberger v. Rossi, 456 U.S. 25, 32 (1982); Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S.
190, 194 (1888). Professor Henkin has noted that while the Supremacy Clause does not
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Wherever possible, international agreements and federal
statutes are both given effect. 193 In cases of conflict, however,
the later expression of sovereign authority prevails under lex pos-
terior derogat priori, the last-in-time doctrine. Thus, a later federal
statute supersedes an inconsistent international obligation. Sim-
ilarly, a later international obligation supersedes an inconsistent
federal statute. In The Cherokee Tobacco, the Supreme Court ex-
amined a conflict between an 1866 treaty and the Internal Reve-
nue Act of 1868.194 The Court noted that "[u]ndoubtedly one
or the other must yield .... A treaty may supersede a prior act of
Congress, and an act of Congress may supersede a prior
treaty." 95 The Supreme Court has consistently upheld the doc-
trine that conflicts between treaties and federal legislation are
resolved in favor of the most recently enacted measure.
1 96
International agreements, however, do not automatically
create binding obligations or judicially enforceable rights in the
U.S. legal system. Under the principles first enunciated in Foster
v. Nielson, unless a treaty by its terms makes clear that no further
Congressional action is required, or unless Congress enacts legis-
lation implementing the treaty obligations, the treaty is viewed as
an inter-state contract, unenforceable by private litigants in U.S.
courts. 197 Thus, the status of international obligations in the
United States depends upon either explicit language in the in-
ternational agreement or subsequent implementing legislation
by Congress.1 98  This principle was reiterated by the Supreme
specifically provide that statutes and treaties are equal, the equality of statutes and trea-
ties has been upheld in numerous cases. Henkin, supra, at 1563.
193. Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64 (1804). Indeed, it
is well-settled that "an Act of Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of
nations if other possible construction remains." Murray 6 U.S. at 118. See also United
States v. Palestine Liberation Organization, 695 F.Supp. 1456, 1464-65 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
194. The Cherokee Tobacco, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 616 (1870).
195. Id. at 620-21.
196. See, e.g., Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. at 600; The Head Money Cases, 112
U.S. 580, 599 (1884). See asoJonathan Turley, Dualistic Values in the Age of International
Legisprudence, 44 HASTINGs L.J. 185, 226 (1993).
197. Foster v. Nielson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314 (1829).
198. See Saipan v. U.S. Dep't of the Interior, 502 F.2d 90 (9th Cir. 1974). A deter-
mination of self-execution should be informed by a framework that requires an analysis
of four distinct elements: (1) the intent of the parties; (2) the availability of alternative
enforcement mechanisms; (3) the implications of implying self-execution versus non-
self-execution; and (4) the existence of appropriate domestic procedures and institu-
tions for the direct implementation of the treaty obligation. Saipan, 502 F.2d at 97. See
also Frolova v. U.S.S.R., 761 F.2d 370, 373 (7th Cir. 1985).
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Court in The Head Money Cases where it explained that "[a] treaty
is primarily a compact between independent nations."19 9 The
Court added that a treaty:
Depends for the enforcement of its provisions on the interest
and the honor of the governments which are parties to it. If
these fail, its infraction becomes the subject of international
negotiations and reclamations, so far as the injured party
chooses to seek redress, which may in the end be enforced by
actual war.2 ° °
It is critical, therefore, to distinguish between the interna-
tional and domestic obligations that flow from international
agreements. An international agreement creates a binding obli-
gation at the international level. The doctrine of pacta sunt ser-
vanda provides that every international agreement is binding
upon the parties and must be performed by them in good
faith.2 1 Thus, the United States is responsible for adhering to
its obligations at the international level. Indeed, it may not cite
inconsistent domestic law as an excuse for disregarding its inter-
national obligation. 02 A country's failure to abide by the terms
of an international agreement is a violation of the agreement
and may subject that state to sanctions.
In contrast, an international agreement does not automati-
199. The Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580, 598 (1884).
200. Id. See also Sei Fujii v. State, 38 Cal.2d 718 (1952) (ruling that U.N. Charter
does not create enforceable rights). But see Saipan, 502 F.2d at 101 (holding that U.N.
Trusteeship Agreement established direct, affirmative, and judicially enforceable
rights).
201. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 26, 155
U.N.T.S. 331, 339, 1980 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 58, at 1 (amd. 7964) [hereinafter Vienna
Convention] (entered into force January 27, 1990).
202. IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAw 35-36 (4th ed.
1990); Vienna Convention, supra note 201, art. 27, 155 U.N.T.S. at 339, 1980 Gr. Brit.
T.S. No. 58, at 17. Article 27 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties provides
that "[a] party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for its
failure to perform a treaty." Id. Similarly, Article 46 provides:
A state may not invoke the fact that its consent to be bound by a treaty has
been expressed in violation of a provision of its internal law regarding compe-
tence to conclude treaties as invalidating its consent unless that violation as
manifest and concerned a rule of its internal law of fundamental importance.
A violation is manifest if it would be objectively evident to any State con-
ducting itself in the matter in accordance with normal practice and in good
faith.
Viennna Convention, supra note 201, art. 46, 155 U.N.T.S. at 343, 1980 Gr. Brit. T.S.
No. 58, at 23.
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cally create a binding obligation at the domestic level. Interna-
tional agreements create binding obligations at the domestic
level only after explicit authorization in the agreement or subse-
quent implementing legislation by Congress. Moreover, under
the last-in-time doctrine, the United States can subsequently re-
nounce an international obligation at the domestic level.20 As
the Supreme Court noted in The Paquete Habana, international
law is controlling only "where there is no treaty and no control-
ling executive or legislative act or judicial decision."" 4 While
such action may create international liabilities, there is no means
for redress in domestic courts.
2. International Agreements and State Law
International agreements do not automatically create bind-
ing obligations or enforceable rights at the state level. Rather,
Congress is required to enact legislation implementing the inter-
national obligations at the domestic level unless the agreement
makes clear that no further congressional action is required. In
this respect, international agreements have the same impact on
states as they do on the Federal Government.
In contrast to federal law, however, international agree-
ments always take precedence over inconsistent state law. Under
the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution, international agree-
203. See e.g., Diggs v. Shultz, 470 F.2d 461, 465-67 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411
U.S. 931 (1973). For example, in Diggs v. Shultz, the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit noted that it is a well settled constitutional doctrine that Congress may nullify, in
whole or in part, a treaty commitment. Diggs, 470 F.2d at 465. Indeed, "[u]nder our
constitutional scheme, Congress can denounce treaties if it sees fit to do so, and there is
nothing the other branches of government can do about it." Id. at 466. See also Moser
v. United States, 341 U.S. 41, 45 (1951); Edye v. Robertson, 112 U.S. 580, 597 (1884).
204. ThePaqueteHabana, 175 U.S. at 700. See also The Nereide, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch)
388, 423 (1815); Garcia-Mir v. Meese, 788 F.2d 1446, 1453 (1 1th Cir. 1986). It has been
suggested, however, that Congress may not override all international obligations. See
Committee of U.S. Citizens Living in Nicaragua v. Reagan, 859 F.2d 929, 941 (D.C. Cir.
1989). In Committee of United States Citizens Living in Nicaragua v. Reagan, the Court of
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit suggested that there are certain norms of international law
that Congress and the President may not violate. Reagan, 859 F.2d at 941.
Such basic norms of international law as the proscription against murder and
slavery may well... restrain our government in the same way that the Consti-
tution restrains it. If Congress adopted a foreign policy that resulted in the
enslavement of our citizens or other individuals, that policy might well be sub-
ject to challenge in domestic court under international law.
Id. See also Ralph Steinhardt, The Role of International Law As a Canon of Domestic Statutory
Construction, 43 VAND. L. REv. 1103, 1162-65 (1990).
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ments are considered the supreme law of the land and, there-
fore, are superior to state law.205 In Missouri v. Holland,0 6 the
Supreme Court affirmed the validity of a treaty and subsequent
implementing legislation against charges that they were "an un-
constitutional interference with the rights reserved to the States
by the Tenth Amendment" and that they threatened to "invade
the sovereign right of the State and contravene its will mani-
fested in statutes."217 The Court noted that "[a]s most of the
laws of the United States are carried out within the States and as
many of them deal with matter which in the silence of such laws
the State might regulate, such general grounds are not enough
to support Missouri's claim. "208 "Valid treaties of course are as
binding within the territorial limits of the State as they are else-
where throughout the dominion of the United States .... No
doubt the great body of private relations usually fall within the
control of the State, but a treaty may override its power."2 0 9 The
Supreme Court reiterated this principle in United States v. Bel-
mont,210 where it noted that "plainly, the external powers of the
United States are to be exercised without regard to state laws or
policies. In respect of all international negotiations and com-
pacts, and in respect of our foreign relations generally, state
lines disappear."21 1 More recently, in Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of
Los Angeles, 2 the Supreme Court held that a California tax lev-
ied on the containers of a Japanese shipping company was an
invalid state intrusion on the exclusive power of the Federal Gov-
ernment to regulate foreign commerce.2 13  The Court noted
that in matters of international trade, the United States "speaks
205. See, e.g., Kenneth J. Cooper, To Compel or Encourage: Seeking Compliance with
International Trade Agreements at the State Level, 2 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 143, 144-48
(1993); Note, Judicial Enforcement of International Law Against the Federal and State Govern-
ments, 104 HAuv. L. REv. 1269, 1271 (1991).
206. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
207. Holland, 252 U.S. at 431. See Asakura v. Seattle, 265 U.S. 332, 341 (1924).
208. Holland, 252 U.S. at 431.
209. Id. at 432-34. See Baldwin v. Franks, 120 U.S. 678, 683 (1887) (stating that
valid treaties are binding throughout territory and states of United States); Hopkirk v.
Bell, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 453, 458 (1806) (holding that treaty of peace between United
States and Great Britain could not be amended by individual U.S. states); Ware v. Hyl-
ton, 3 U.S. (3 DalI.) 199, 236-37 (1796) (stating that treaties made by United States are
supreme law of land, and state legislatures cannot stand in their way).
210. United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937).
211. Belmont, 301 U.S. at 331.
212. Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434 (1979).
213. Japan Line, Ltd., 441 U.S. at 434.
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with one voice. "214
B. The Implications of the Uruguay Round Agreements on U.S. Law
A cursory review of the Uruguay Round Agreements reveals
the profound impact of its substantive provisions on interna-
tional trade matters. For example, the Agreement on Technical
Barriers to Trade requires that technical regulations, including
those designed to protect health, safety, and the environment,
must not be more trade-restrictive than necessary to fulfill a legit-
imate objective. 5 Member States must use international techni-
cal regulations when such standards exist. 16 Similarly, the
Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary
Measures requires sanitary and phytosanitary measures to be ap-
plied only to the extent necessary to protect human, animal, or
plant life or health. 217 Member States must base their sanitary
and phytosanitary measures on international standards, guide-
lines, and recommendations where such standards exist.
218
Clearly, adherence to these and similar rules will have a signifi-
cant impact on Member States.
1. The Implications of the Uruguay Round Agreements on
Federal Law
The Uruguay Round Agreements Act evinces the inexorable
struggle between the desire to maintain authority over domestic
matters and the need to comply with international obligations.
The Uruguay Round Agreements Act provides that any provision
in the Uruguay Round Agreements that is inconsistent with U.S.
law shall have no effect. Indeed, nothing in the implementing
legislation shall be construed to amend, modify, or limit any U.S.
law. One must note, however, that the Uruguay Round Agree-
214. Id. at 449 (quoting Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, 423 U.S. 276, 285 (1976)).
215. Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, art. 2(2), Annex 1A, Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, April 15, 1994, reprinted in, H.R. Doc. No.
316, 103rd Cong., 2d Sess. 1381 (1994). See aso Testimony of Professor Laurence Tribe
before the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation, supra note 7.
216. Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, supra note 215, art. 2.4.
217. Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, art.
2(2), Annex 1A, Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, April 15, 1994,
reprinted in H.R. Doc. No. 316, 103rd Cong., 2d Sess. 1381 (1994).
218. Id. art. 3(1), GATT SECRETARIAT - TRADE NEGOTIATIONS COMMITrEE, FINAL
ACT EMBODYING THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTINATIONAL TRADE NEGO-
TIATIONS (1993) MTN/FA II-A1A-4.
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ments Act only defines the rights and obligations created by the
Uruguay Round Agreements at the domestic level. It does not
alter or amend U.S. obligations at the international level. The
United States remains bound by the provisions of the Uruguay
Round Agreements at the international level. 19 Its international
obligations will remain intact unless it withdraws from the Uru-
guay Round Agreements or seeks a waiver of its obligations.
An example of the dichotomy between domestic actions
and international obligations can be found in the implementing
legislation. Section 102(a) (2) (B) of the Uruguay Round Agree-
ments Act 220 reaffirms the authority of the U.S. Trade Represen-
tative to act under § 301 of the Trade Act of 1974.221 Section
301 was established by Congress to protect the United States
from unfair trade practices. 2 2 2  Section 301 (a) requires
mandatory retaliation against a foreign government if the Trade
Representative determines that the rights of the United States
under any trade agreement are being denied, or a foreign gov-
ernment practice violates, or is inconsistent with, or otherwise
denies benefits to the United States under a trade agreement, or
such action is unjustifiable and burdens U.S. commerce.223 Sec-
tion 301 (b) authorizes the Trade Representative to take discre-
tionary action if a foreign government practice is unreasonable
219. See generally Thomas William France, The Domestic Legal Status of the GA7T: The
Need for Clarification, 51 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 148.1 (1994); Brand, supra note 185;Jack-
son, supra note 185.
220. Uruguay Round Agreements Act § 102(a) (2) (B), 19 U.S.C. § 3512 (1994).
221. See generally, Alan Skyes, Constructive Unilateral Threats in International Commer-
cial Relations: The Limited Case for Section 301, 23 L. & POL'Y. INr'L Bus. 263 (1991)
[hereinafter Constructive Unilateral Threats]; AGGRESSIVE UNILATERALISM (Jagdish
Bhagwati and Hugh Patrick eds., 1990); Alan Sykes, Mandatory Relation for Breach of Trade
Agreements: Some Thoughts on the Strategic Design of Section 301, 8 B.U. INT'L L.J. 301
(1990).
222. See Trade Act of 1988, 19 U.S.C. § 2420 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). The 1988
Trade Act introduced a new mechanism called Super 301 that requires the Trade Rep-
resentative to identify trade liberalization priorities. Id. These consist of priority for-
eign country practices, including major barriers and trade distorting practices, the elim-
ination of which are likely to have the most significant potential to increase U.S. ex-
ports. The 1988 Trade Act also introduced another mechanism called Special 301 that
requires the Trade Representative to identify countries that deny adequate and effective
protection of intellectual property protection. 19 U.S.C. § 2242. The Trade Represen-
tative is required to initiate investigations with respect to these practices unless it deter-
mines that the initiation of an investigation would be detrimental to U.S. economic
interests. 19 U.S.C. § 2412(b) (2) (B).
223. 19 U.S.C. § 2411(a)(1).
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or discriminatory and burdens or restricts U.S. commerce."'
Retaliation is subject to the specific direction of the President.2 25
Retaliation can include the suspension or withdrawal of benefits
of trade agreements as well as duties or other import restric-
226
The use of § 301 unilateral trade sanctions by the United
States against Members of the WTO Agreement based on issues
that are encompassed by the Uruguay Round Agreements would
be a violation of the Uruguay Round Agreements. 227 The Dis-
pute Settlement Understanding contains the exclusive proce-
dures for the resolution of trade disputes.22 8 Article 3 of the Dis-
pute Settlement Understanding provides that the dispute settle-
ment process established by the Uruguay Round Agreements is
essential to providing security and predictability to the multilat-
eral trading system. Article 23 requires Member States seeking
redress for a violation of the Covered Agreements to abide by
the rules and procedures of the Dispute Settlement Understand-
ing. Thus, a Member State is not entitled to take unilateral ac-
tion to seek redress of a violation of obligations or other nullifi-
cation or impairment of benefits.21 Indeed, U.S. Trade Repre-
sentative Michael Kantor has, in fact, acknowledged that the
224. 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (b).
225. 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (b) (2).
226. 19 U.S.C. § 2411(c).
227. See generally Nara Fusae, A Shift Toward Protectionism Under Section 301 of the
1974 Trade Act: Problems of Unilateral Trade Retaliation Under International Law, 19 Hor-
STRA L. REV. 229 (1990). But seeJames R. Arnold, The Oilseeds Dispute and the Validity of
Unilateralism in a Multilateral Context, 30 STAN. J. INT'L L. 187 (1994); Robert Hudec,
Thinking About the New Section 301: Beyond Good and Evil, in AGGRESSIVE UNILATERALISM,
supra note 221, at 113, 137-38.
228. Andreas Lowenfeld, Remedies Along With Rights: Institutional Reform in the New
GATT, 88 AM. J. INT'L L. 477, 486 (1994). Andreas Lowenfeld noted the exclusive na-
ture of the WTO dispute resolution process. Id. at 486. He suggested that a losing
party in the dispute settlement process may not say, "We tried the GATT process and it
didn't work, so we will take retaliatory measures on our own." Id.
229. EuRoPEAN COMMISSION, THE URUGUAY ROUND: BACKGROUND BRIEF 204
(1994). According to the European Union, the use of unilateral trade sanctions would
be in violation of the WTO Agreement. Id.
The aim behind the WTO is that Members agree to settle their trade disputes
multilaterally through the WTO instead of bilaterally or even, in the case of
Section 301 of the U.S. Trade Act, unilaterally .... One of the central provi-
sions of the agreement is that Members shall not themselves make determina-
tion of violations, or suspend concessions, but shall make use of the new dis-
pute settlement procedure.
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United States is required to take § 301 cases that fall under the
Uruguay Round Agreements to the WTO for dispute resolu-
tion. 230
One must recognized, however, that the Uruguay Round
Agreements have no direct effect on the United States. U.S. laws
cannot be amended or modified by the WTO. Similarly, the
United States cannot be compelled to take any action in contra-
vention of federal law without the approval of the Executive and
Legislative Branches. 23 ' Thus, the United States may take any
action it deems appropriate, including unilateral action under
§ 301, regardless of contrary provisions in the Uruguay Round
Agreements. 232
230. Kantor added, however, that the United States remains free to take unilateral
action under Section 301 against states, such as China, that are not Members of the
WTO or concerning issues that do not fall under the Uruguay Round Agreements. See
GATT-USTR Says Accord Reserves Section 301; Gephardt Pledges Support For GATT Deal, 11
INT'L TRADE REP. 30 (1994).
231. GATT Director General Peter Sutherland noted that "[tihe WTO can over-
ride neither national laws nor national legislators." According to Sutherland:
The WTO can oversee retaliation in the event that there is inadequate imple-
mentation. What it cannot do is dictate to any government how that govern-
ment or legislature should respond to a dispute settlement finding. That is
the way it has been under GATr for 46 years, and it is the way it will be under
the WTO."
Sutherland added that other countries, "not least the member states of the European
Union," have not expressed concern over the sovereignty issue. See Gary Yerkey, Head of
GATT Says U.S. Plan to Withdraw From WTO is Inconsistent With Accord, 11 Irr'L TRADE
REP. 1787 (Nov. 23, 1994). In testimony before the Senate Committee on Foreign Re-
lations, Bruce Fein argued that such statements are sheer sophistry. "The WTO would
create obligations that would impair U.S. sovereignty because disobedience to WTO
panel rulings triggers a right to impose economic sanctions against the nation or oblige
it to pay monetary compensation." World Trade Organization, Hearings Before the Committee
on Foreign Relations, 103rd Cong., 2nd Sess. (June 14, 1994) (statement of Bruce Fein).
According to Fein, sovereignty is not maintained merely because a state retains a choice
between compliance with an international obligation or punishment. Id. "If the main-
tenance of United States sovereignty under international accords means no more than
that the nation is permitted to violate any obligation and accept the international law
consequences, then sovereignty is reduced to triviality." Id.
232. See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, THE GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND
TRADE: URUGUAY ROUND FINAL ACT SHOULD PRODUCE OVERALL U.S. ECONOMIC GAINS
16-17 (1994). According to a study by the General Accounting Office:
[U]nder the Final Act of the Uruguay Round, the United States would still be
able to use its trade laws and other domestic policies, even utilizing unilateral
trade actions. However, if it were to act strictly unilaterally in ways that vio-
lated WTO obligations, rules, or decisions, the United States would have to
weigh the resulting costs. One cost would be the specific trade sanctions au-
thorized by WTO if, for example, the United States were to refuse to comply
with a decision made by a dispute settlement panel. Another cost would be
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Thus, statements that the Uruguay Round Agreements af-
fect U.S. sovereignty are only partially accurate. By participating
in the Uruguay Round Agreements, the United States has agreed
to conform its behavior to a specific international standard.233
The United States, however, maintains sovereign authority to de-
termine and regulate its behavior at both the domestic and inter-
national levels. Notwithstanding, such action may violate U.S.
obligations under the Uruguay Round Agreements and subject
the United States to sanctions under the Dispute Settlement Un-
derstanding.
2. The Implications of the Uruguay Round Agreements on
State Law
The implications of the Uruguay Round Agreements on
state law are significant. Like federal law, state legislation is sub-
ject to the substantive provisions of the Agreements. As a result,
state legislation is subject to challenges by WTO Members. In-
deed, Article 22(9) of the Dispute Settlement Understanding
provides that the dispute settlement provisions of the Covered
Agreements may be applied to regional or local governments.
The Uruguay Round Agreements Act seeks to mitigate the
implications of the Uruguay Round Agreements on state law. It
provides that no state law, or the application of a state law, may
be declared invalid on the ground that it is inconsistent with any
of the Uruguay Round Agreements. Rather, the Federal Govern-
ment is granted an exclusive right of action for the purpose of
declaring a state law invalid under the Uruguay Round Agree-
undermining support for a system that the United States sought to strengthen
because it felt that doing so would be in its best overall interests.
Id.
233. It should also be noted that the principal rationale behind Section 301 is no
longer present as the Uruguay Round Agreements address many of the concerns ex-
pressed by the United States regarding the basic GATT structure. Indeed, the desire to
establish a more effective and expeditious dispute settlement mechanism was a princi-
pal U.S. negotiating objective. The purpose for such a mechanism is clear: to ensure
that GATT obligations are protected. Section 301 was an important instrument of U.S.
trade policy precisely because GATT obligations could not be adequately protected
under the prior system. In contrast, the Uruguay Round Agreements establish a bind-
ing dispute settlement mechanism. Thus, the need for unilateral action such as Section
301 is greatly diminished. See, e.g., Marjorie Minkler, The Omnibus Trade Act of 1988,
Section 301: A Permissible Enforcement Mechanism or a Violation of the United States' Obliga-
tions Under International Law?, 11 J.L. & COM. 283 (1992); Constructive Unilateral Threats,
supra note 221, at 289-291; Robert Hudec, supra note 227, at 113.
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ments. 234 As mentioned in the previous section, however, the
Uruguay Round Agreements Act only defines the rights and obli-
gations created by the Uruguay Round Agreements at the do-
mestic level. It does not alter or amend U.S. obligations at the
international level.
A recent example of the consequences that arise when state
legislation violates a GAT obligation is the Measures Affecting Al-
coholic and Malt Beverages case between the United States and
Canada.35 Canada brought a GAT complaint against numer-
ous U.S. state measures regulating alcoholic beverages. These
measures included state tax measures, distribution barriers, li-
censing fees, transportation requirements, alcohol content regu-
lations, and listing policies. The Canadian complaint charged
that these measures created significant discrimination against
the sale of Canadian alcoholic beverages in the United States.
Accordingly, Canada indicated that the effect of these measures
was to nullify or impair benefits accruing to Canada under the
GATT. The GATT dispute settlement panel determined that
many of the state measures were impermissible. Indeed, the
panel ruled that even if measures were applied regardless of na-
tionality, they were impermissible if they discriminated against
like products. Thus, the panel recommended that the United
States bring its inconsistent federal and state measures into con-
formity with its GATT obligations.
C. The WTO Dispute Settlement Review Commission
Senator Dole referred to the Dispute Settlement Review
Commission as the "three strikes and we're out" mechanism."3 6
According to Senator Dole:
This process is unprecedented in the history of U.S. trade
agreements. It is not a fig-leaf - it is not just another layer of
complexity. It provides a clear, quick exit if our rights are
234. Testimony of Professor Laurence Tribe before the Senate Committee on
Commerce, Science and Transportation, supra note 7. Professor Tribe suggests that this
process creates an anomalous situation where the Trade Representative is required to
defend a challenged state law before a dispute settlement panel and subsequently chal-
lenge the same state law in the United States. Id. at 295-96.
235. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: Panel Report-United States
Measures Affecting Alcoholic and Malt Beverages, June 19, 1992, available in LEXIS,
Intlaw Library, BDIEL File.
236. Peter Behr, Dole's Concerns About GA7T Seem to Be Easing, WASH. POST, Nov. 23,
1994, at A8.
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being trampled in the WTO. It provides Congress with a de-
cisive role in determining whether the interests of the U.S.
are being (more) served by continued membership in the
WTO. If not, we will withdraw. This process is vastly different
from the six-month withdrawal provision in the WTO agree-
ment itself. That provision does nothing more than state
every country's right to withdraw. Unlike my proposal, it does
not provide for careful scrutiny of individual cases, it does not
provide for any congressional role, and in fact, it is unlikely
that such a provision would ever be used. My new proposal
provides real and effective protection against abuses of U.S.
sovereignty in the World Trade Organization.2 3
7
The proposed legislation establishing the Dispute Settle-
ment Review Commission provides three elements not found in
the implementing legislation. First, it establishes an additional
level of domestic review concerning U.S. participation in the
Uruguay Round Agreements. As indicated, the Commission
provides an independent review of all final WTO dispute settle-
ment reports. Second, the proposed legislation provides Con-
gress with the authority to introduce a Joint Resolution that
would require the President to negotiate new dispute settlement
rules that address any problems identified by the Commission.
Such action could only be taken following the issuance of a deci-
sion by the Commission that the dispute settlement panel or Ap-
pellate Body acted inappropriately. Third, the proposed legisla-
tion provides an additional opportunity for Members of Con-
gress to seek U.S. withdrawal from the Uruguay Round
Agreements. It provides that any Member of Congress can intro-
duce a Joint Resolution to disapprove of U.S. participation in the
WTO if the Commission makes three affirmative determinations
in any five-year period. Both resolutions would be privileged
and floor action would be expedited under the same procedures
found in § 125 of the implementing legislation.
The benefits of the proposed legislation are twofold. Proce-
durally, it establishes an additional level of review and expedited
legislative procedures for Congressional action. More broadly,
the proposed legislation establishes a trigger mechanism for con-
gressional action if the dispute settlement process acts inconsis-
tently with U.S. interests. The proposed legislation does not,
237. Bob Dole, Congressional Press Releases, supra note 175.
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however, alter the international obligations of the United States.
Thus, while it may improve Congressional oversight at the do-
mestic level, the rights and obligations of the United States have
not been changed at the international level.
CONCLUSION
States are constantly faced with a choice between relying on
multilateral cooperation or resorting to unilateral action to pro-
tect their interests. This is an inevitable consequence of the an-
archic nature of the international system. Like Rousseau's para-
ble of the stag hunt, states must choose between the uncertainty
of multilateral cooperation and the short term benefits of unilat-
eral action.23 8
The Uruguay Round Agreements are designed to facilitate
cooperative behavior in the realm of international trade. They
accomplish this goal in several ways. First, the Uruguay Round
Agreements replace short-term tactical calculations with long-
term strategic analysis. "The distinction between cases in which
similar transactions among parties are unlikely to be repeated
and cases in which the expectation of future interaction can in-
fluence decisions in the present is fundamental to the emer-
gence of cooperation among egotists."23 9 If a Member State vio-
lates a provision in the Agreements, it must recognize that any
short-term gain may be offset by the long-term ramifications of
its actions. For example, constant violations may lead to the de-
mise of the Agreement. Second, the Agreements reduce uncer-
tainty by providing states with reliable information and increased
transparency. Thus, they provide a stable structure upon which
to base state relations.240 Third, the Uruguay Round Agree-
ments establish a monitoring system that reviews state behavior
and identifies potential violations. The existence of a legal sys-
tem that monitors the behavior of the participants and identifies
238. J.J. Rousseau, Discourse on the Origin of Inequality, in BASIC POLITICAL WRITINGS
OF JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU 62 (Donald Cress trans. 1987). In the parable of the stag
hunt, several hunters agree to cooperate to catch a stag. Id. When one hunter defects
from the group in order to catch a rabbit, the group fails to catch the stag. Id.
239. Kenneth Oye, Explaining Cooperation Under Anarchy: Hypotheses and Strategies,
38 WORLD POL. 1, 12 (1985). See also ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERA-
TION (1984).
240. DOUGLASS NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC PER-
FORMANCE 3 (1990); David Kreps & Robert Wilson, Reputation and Imperfect Information,
27J. ECON. THEORY 253 (1982).
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transgressions of commonly agreed rules contributes to the effi-
cacy of cooperative agreements. 24' Finally, the Agreements pro-
vide sanctions for violations.2 4 2 The establishment of an effective
dispute settlement process is perhaps the most significant ac-
complishment of the Uruguay Round negotiations. By creating
an effective multilateral sanctioning mechanism, Uruguay
Round Agreements reduce the need for unilateral action by
Member States and affirms the legitimacy of a rule-based sys-
tem.
243
Each of these factors comprise an integral component of
the Uruguay Round Agreements. Indeed, these factors establish
the basic framework for developing cooperative behavior in the
international system. If states seek to move beyond the realm of
power politics, they must establish institutional arrangements
that promote cooperation "after hegemony." This entails a fun-
damental recognition by national governments - that institu-
tions provide a credible basis for the protection of state inter-
ests.24 4 As noted by Robert Keohane:
Committing oneself to an international regime implies a deci-
sion to restrict one's own pursuit of advantage on specific is-
sues in the future. Certain alternatives that might otherwise
appear desirable - imposing quotas, manipulating exchange
rates, hoarding one's own oil in a crisis - become unaccept-
able by the standards of the regime .... Where there are
substantial common interests to be realized through agree-
241. Geoffrey Garrett, International Cooperation and Institutional Choice: The Euro-
pean Community's Internal Market, 46 INT'L ORG. 533, 557 (1992); Paul Milgrom et al., The
Role of Institutions in the Revival of Trade, 2 ECON. & POL. 1 (1990).
242. Robert Axelrod & Robert Keohane, Achieving Cooperation Under Anarchy: Strat-
egies and Institutions, 38 WORLD POL. 226, 234-36 (1985).
243. See generally Kenneth Abbott, GATT as a Public Institution: The Uruguay Round
and Beyond, 18 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 31 (1992); William Davey, Dispute Settlement in GATT,
11 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 51, 65 (1987); OLIVIER LONG, LAW AND ITS LIMITATIONS IN THE
GATT MULTILATERAL TRADE SYSTEM 61-64 (1987); Phillip Trimble, International Trade
and the Rule of Law, 83 MICH. L. REv. 1016, 1017 (1985); Robert Hudec, GATTDispute
Settlement After the Tokyo Round: An Unfinished Business, 13 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 145, 151-
53 (1980).
244. See NEOREALISM AND NEOLIBERALIsM: THE CONTEMPORARY DEBATE (David
Baldwin ed., 1993) (reviewing institutionalist literature). See also Robert Keohane, Inter-
national Institutions: Two Approaches, 32 INT'L STUD. Q. 384 (1988); Charles Lipson, Inter-
national Cooperation in Economic and Security Affairs, 37 WORLD POL. 1 (1984). But see
John Mearsheimer, The False Promise of International Institutions, 19 INT'L SEC. 5 (1994/
95); Joseph Grieco, Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest
Liberal Institutionalism, 42 INT'L ORG. 486, 498 (1988).
1995]
474 FORDHAMINTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL [Vol. 19:427
ment, the value of a reputation for faithfully carrying out
agreements may outweigh the costs of consistently accepting
the constraints of international rules. To pursue self-interest
does not require maximizing freedom of action. On the con-
trary, intelligent and far-sighted leaders understand that at-
tainment of their objectives may depend on their commit-
ment to the institutions that make cooperation possible.245
By approving U.S. participation in the Uruguay Round
Agreements, the United States has agreed to be bound by the
rules and procedures of this new multilateral trading system.
While the United States maintains absolute sovereignty over do-
mestic matters, it is responsible for adhering to its obligations at
the international level. To the extent that the United States
wishes to participate in the Uruguay Round Agreements, it must
abide by the rules and procedures of this system. Since the fac-
tors described above are essential to the success of the Uruguay
Round Agreements, indeed to any international institution, it
appears that the issue of lost sovereignty will remain a recurring
and inevitable problem for the nation-state in the modern inter-
national system.246
245. ROBERT KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY. COOPERATION AND DISCORD IN THE
WORLD POLITICAL ECONOMY 258-59 (1984).
246. See Kieran Cooke & Gordon Cramb, Neighbors' Tiff Becomes First WTO Case, FIN.
TIMES, Feb. 23, 1995, at 4. The first WTO dispute settlement complaint was filed in
February 1995 by Singapore against Malaysia and concerns imports restrictions on
plastic resins. Id. U.S. Ures Broad Representation on Investigative Dispute Panels, 12 INT'L
TRADE REP. 295 (1995); Guy Dejonquieres, WTO Receives First Calls to Settle Disputes, FIN.
TIMES, Feb. 11, 1995, at 3.
